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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This matter is before the Court on appeal from a final order of the Utah Labor
Commission. Jurisdiction is appropriate in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§
34A-2-801(9); 630-4-403(1); and 78A-4-103(2)(a)(i)(A).

ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. The Utah Labor Commission incorrectly, and by improper means, found that
Mondragon sustained an industrial accident.
2. The Utah Labor Commission incorrectly found that Mondragon's alleged
industrial accident satisfies the medical causation element of an accident claim.
3. The Utah Labor Commission improperly denied Respondents' request for
additional discovery concerning the veracity of Mondragon's injury claim.
4. The Utah Labor Commission took improper sua sponte actions in asserting
accident theories on Mondragon's behalf, and awarding benefits based thereon.

PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES:

All issues on appeal were raised and preserved

through JP's Motion for Review and Motion for Reconsideration. [R. at 166-198; 207212.]

STANDARD OF REVIEW: Relief from a final order of the Utah Labor Commission
shall be granted if the party seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by
the Commission's erroneous interpretation or application of law, a finding of fact not
supported by substantial evidence, or by agency action that is an abuse of discretion or
otherwise arbitrary and capricious. Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-403(4 ).

STA TEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises from Mondragon' s claim of entitlement to workers' compensation
benefits for a right knee injury allegedly caused by his employment with JP's
Landscaping. Respondents, JP' s Landscaping and Auto Owners Insurance (collectively
"JP's") disputed the validity of Mondragon's claim. During the evidentiary hearing, the
accident alleged by Mondragon to have caused his injury was disproved. The
(,,L

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") entered findings documenting that fact, but
nonetheless proceeded to refer Mondragon' s claim for consideration by a medical panel
on the basis of her own alternative accident theory, and eventually entered an order
awarding benefits to Mondragon based thereupon.
Through objections and interlocutory motions, JP's challenged the ALJ's actions
as improper. JP's argued that the ALJ's adoption of an alternative mechanism of injury
not asserted by Mondragon was improper, lacked evidentiary support, and constituted
impermissible advocacy by the Labor Commission. The Utah Labor Commission adopted
the ALJ' s actions as proper, further compounded the same through its own unsupported
findings, and declined to correct the errors on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Mondragon, through an August 17, 2012 Application for Hearing, alleged

that on May 22, 2012, his first day of employment with JP' s, he was injured in an
industrial accident when his right knee was "caught" by the handles of a tipping
wheelbarrow. [R. at 1]
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2.

JP's filed an Answer denying liability for Mondragon's claims, asserting

that Mondragon's condition was not caused by the alleged accident. [R. at 17.]
3.

On the date of the alleged industrial injury, Mondragon was seen by Dr.

Britt at Work.Med. Mondragon reported that he was at work pushing a wheelbarrow that
tipped to the side. Mondragon alleged that the two handles of the wheelbarrow caught his
leg and twisted it in different directions, causing pressure on his knee. The treating
physician found that Mondragon' s knee was normal in appearance, showing no bruising
with only a possibility of slight swelling, and diagnosed a right knee sprain. [R. 220 at

30.]
4.

Only one other treatment record documents Mondragon's reported

mechanism of injury. Mondragon reported to Dr. Andruss that he was pushing a
wheelbarrow which fell on its side, trapping his right knee in a rotation type injury. [R.
220 at 52.]
5.

Mondragon was later examined by Dr. Bart Fotheringham, who offered a

diagnosis of right knee pain syndrome with possible meniscal abnormalities and
degenerative changes. Dr. Fotheringham found that Mondragon has an extensive history
of prior knee pain and that the alleged industrial accident only temporarily aggravated
Mondragon' s preexisting right knee degenerative changes. [R. 220 at 64 (pp. 11-13 of
report).]
6.

During the discovery period, JP's discovered a history of industrial claims

demonstrating a pattern whereby both Mondragon and his adult son had claimed multiple
industrial injuries at the same prior, successive employers. [R. 180-198.] In an effort to
3

investigate the questionable claims history, JP' s requested releases from Mondragon' s
adult son to obtain claims information that JP's deemed relevant to determining the
veracity of Mondragon's claim. [R. at 23 (notifying the ALJ that JP's suspected fraud);
R. at 28.] Mondragon refused to comply with JP's discovery efforts, and the Commission
declined to compel the production of the requested information. [R. at 63.]
7.

During the evidentiary hearing before the ALJ, and upon direct questions

by the ALJ, Mondragon offered testimony consistent with his Application for Hearing
and his reports to the treating physicians. During his presentation of evidence,
Mondragon definitively testified that as he was pushing a large wheelbarrow full of
gravel, it tipped to the right side, catching and twisting his right knee between the two
handles. [R. 221 at 14:17-25; 15:1; Transcript also attached hereto as "Addendum A."]
8.

Upon cross examination, Mondragon again affirmed his allegation that his

right knee became entrapped between the two handles of the tipping wheelbarrow. [R.

221 at 22:12-16.] Mondragon unequivocally testified that as the wheelbarrow tipped to
the right, the handles caught him above and below his knee, with one handle striking the
outside of his right leg, and the other handle striking the inside of the leg. [R. 221 at

24:2-5, 10-15.] Mondragon testified that the injury occurred "when both handles-when
my knee was between both handles, my bone popped." [R. 221 at 24: 15-17.]
9.

JP' s provided a similarly sized wheelbarrow for an in-court physical

demonstration. [R. 221 at 26:5-7]. Mondragon's demonstration with the wheelbarrow
showed that it was not physically possible for the two handles of the wheelbarrow to
simultaneously strike or catch any location on his leg, and that the handles could not have
4

caught and twisted his leg. The demonstration showed that with the wheelbarrow tipped
on its side, with the right handle resting on the ground, the left handle was actually higher
than Mondragon' s leg, resting at a position at or just below Mondragon' s waist. [R. 221
at 27:22-25; 28:1-13.]
10.

Mondragon first testified that there were no witnesses to the accident, and

then alleged that an unidentified co-worker was a witness. However, Mondragon was
unable to produce or identify that alleged witness. [R. 221 at 19:25; 20:1-11].
11.

Based upon Mondragon's in-court demonstration,

the questionable

circumstances of the alleged event, the absence of medically documented evidence of a
traumatic injury, and the absence of corroborating witnesses, JP's asserted that the
accident alleged by Mondragon did not occur, and that Mondragon' s claim must be
dismissed as a result. [R. 221 at 31 :23-25 to 3 5: 1-17.]
12.

The ALJ issued an Interim Order finding that the accident alleged by

Mondragon, as shown by "an in court demonstration . . . could not have occurred as
described." [R. at 75.]
13.

The ALJ found that "[t]he exact mechanism of injury is unclear," and

referred the matter to a medical panel for evaluation. [R. at 75-76.] The ALJ's findings
regarding a mechanism of injury were limited to a finding that "Mr. Mondragon was
working with a wheel barrow full of gravel at the time of the injury ... he lost control of
the load and it tipped ... It is clear that Mr. Mondragon felt a pop in the knee." [R. at 75.]
14.

JP's filed an Interlocutory Motion for Review arguing that the Panel

referral was made in error since Mondragon had failed to prove that his accident as
5

alleged had occurred. JP's argued that even if the ALJ somehow found that some
unclaimed alternative theory of accident did occur, Mondragon had provided no
evidentiary or medical support for such a theory. [R. at 81-95.]
15.

Mondragon did not respond to JP's Interlocutory Motion.

16.

The Commission declined to undertake interlocutory review of the matter.

[R. at 96.]
17.

Upon receipt of the Medical Panel Report, JP's filed an objection thereto

arguing again that the referral was improper, and that in any event, the Panel had engaged
in improper fact finding by assuming the existence of a twisting mechanism of injury that
was contrary to the facts in evidence, causing the Panel to ultimately base its conclusions
upon the mechanism of injury that had been disproved. [R. at 107 .]
18.

Mondragon did not respond to JP's Medical Panel Objection.

19.

Through her September 3, 2014, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

Order, the ALJ affirmed her previous factual finding that Mondragon' s alleged injury
could not have occurred as alleged. The ALJ stated that Mondragon' s "accident
description is flawed in the details," and then proceeded to assert an alternative
mechanism of injury on behalf of Mondragon, namely, that Mondragon "did use his legs
and body to try and keep control of the wheel barrow and when the heavy load tipped he
and the wheel barrow where [sic] jerked and tousled." The ALJ found that "the evidence
proved that an accident of substantial exertion took place," however the evidence upon
which that finding was based was not identified. [R. at 118; Order also attached hereto as
"Addendum B. "]
6

20.

The ALJ asserted that Mondragon may have been confused or may have

had a flawed recollection about the mechanism of injury. No evidentiary support for such
an assumption was identified by the ALJ. [R. at 118.]
21.

JP's filed a Motion for Review with the Commission argumg that

Mondragon' s claim was erroneously referred to a Panel and that benefits were awarded
upon an accident theory improperly developed and asserted solely by the ALJ, which
lacked factual support, when the claim should have been dismissed upon Mondragon' s
failure to prove the existence of the industrial accident that he alleged to have caused his
injury. [R. at 124.]
22.

Mondragon did not respond to JP's Motion for Review.

23.

The Commissioner found Mondragon' s allegations of sudden-onset pain, in

combination with his assessment at WorkMed shortly after the alleged injury, to be
sufficient to persuade her that Mondragon did suffer a right knee injury as a result of the
alleged accident. The Commissioner found that "the exact mechanism of injury is
unclear," but echoed the ALJ in noting that where a worker is confused about the
mechanism of injury, the lack of a clear description of the same is not necessarily fatal to
a claim. Ultimately, the Commissioner made the narrow factual finding that the evidence
on record established that "Mondragon's right knee was subject to stress while the fully
loaded wheelbarrow tipped over." Finding that the Panel's conclusion was based upon a
mechanism of injury inconsistent with the evidence established during the hearing, the
Commissioner issued a remand for reevaluation by the Panel based upon her clarified
findings of fact. [R. at 141-145.]
7

24.

The ALJ re-submitted the matter to the Medical Panel, with instructions

regarding the mechanism of injury. Utilizing the Commissioner's findings of fact, the
ALJ's referral memorandum stated: ';the exact mechanism of injury was unclear. What is
established in the record is that Mr. Mondragon's right knee was subject to stress while
the fully loaded wheelbarrow tipped over." The referral memorandum also made clear
that the Panel is "bound by the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" issued by the
Commission. [R. at 148.]

25.

In its revised report, the Medical Panel made additional factual assumptions

not contained in the record. The Panel assumed that Mondragon "tried to plant his feet to
stabilize the wheelbarrow" and that Mondragon "tried to right an out-of-control
wheelbarrow. He was trying to hold the wheelbarrow from tipping. In doing so, he
straightened or bent his knee under considerable abnormal stress." Based upon those
assumptions, the Panel assumed that Mondragon had a history of "a violent stressful
motion type injury" that was consistent with being the industrial cause of his right knee
injury. [R. 152-53.]
26.

Upon receipt of the revised Panel Report, the ALJ issued an Order on

Remand that cursorily adopted the Panel's conclusions and affirmed the prior award of
benefits to Mondragon. [R. at 159-160.]
27.

JP's filed a second Motion for Review, arguing again that the award of

benefits was improper due to Mondragon' s failure to prove the accident he alleged, and
that it was based upon improper assumptions by the Commission, ALJ, and Medical
Panel regarding the existence of an accident different from the one alleged by
8

Mondragon. JP's argued that the Commission's assumed mechanism of injury lacked
medical support and that, at minimum, a remand was necessary to allow JP's the
opportunity to conduct the previously requested discovery into the veracity of
Mondragon' s claims history that was denied during the discovery phase of the case. [R. at

166-177.]
28.

Mondragon did not respond to JP' s second Motion for Review.

29.

The Commission again denied JP's Motion for Review. It held that "the

evidence in the record supports Mr. Mondragon's claim that he sustained a right-knee
injury during the work accident even if it did not happen exactly as he described it to
have occurred." Expanding its former factual findings to comport more closely with the
Medical Panel's assumptions, the Commission stated that "the record does show that
[Mondragon's] right knee was subject to significant stress while carrying a fully loaded
wheelbarrow that tipped over." [R. at 203 (emphasis added); Order Affirming ALJ's
Decision also attached hereto as "Addendum C."]
30.

Rejecting JP's argument that the ALJ improperly advocated on behalf of

Mondragon, the Commission held that "it is not uncommon for an injured worker to be
unclear about a specific exertion that leads to an internal injury." The Commission held
that it "does not agree with JP that [the ALJ] advocated on behalf of Mr. Mondragon by
advancing an alternate theory of the accident because the significant stress on his right
knee was well-established in the record." [R. at 203.] The Commission noted that "JP had
notice of the circumstances of the accident as they were outlined by Dr. Britt at
WorkMed almost immediately after the accident" noting that Dr. Britt had documented
9

Mondragon's alleged mechanism of injury during that first visit, and holding that "[t]hese
are the circumstances that were the basis for the prior decisions from [the ALJ] and the
Commission. [R. at 203.]
31.

In affirming its award of benefits to Mondragon, the Commission explained

how the result was reached in noting that "[t]he Appeals Board agrees with [the ALJ] and
the Commission that an injured worker, especially one who is unrepresented like Mr.
Mondragon, may make a mistake regarding an aspect of his or her claim and that the
underlying evidence may be considered and addressed by the factfinder without crossing
into advocacy or infringing on the due process rights of the employer or insurance carrier.
That is essentially what took place in this case." [R. at 204.]
32.

Because the Commission's Order failed to address JP's request for a

remand to conduct further discovery into Mondragon's questionable claims history, and
the circumstances of the instant claim, JP's filed a Request for Reconsideration on that
narrow issue. [R. at 207.]
33.

Mondragon did not respond to JP's Request for Reconsideration.

34.

In denying JP's Request for Reconsideration, the Commission held that

JP's had presented "no actual evidence of fraud on Mr. Mondragon's part," and that "JP's
assertion that Mr. Mondragon is not credible and may be committing fraud is no more
than speculation without evidence of actual fraud." The Commission therefore declined
to remand the case to allow further discovery. [R. at 217-18; Order Denying Request for
Reconsideration also attached hereto as "Addendum D."]
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Commission's award of benefits to Mondragon is premised upon factual
findings not supported by the evidence elicited at hearing, but solely upon unsupported
inference and assumption by the ALJ and Commission. Upon conclusion of the
evidentiary hearing, all evidence, including the medical records and Mondragon' s own
testimony and in-court demonstration, pointed only to Mondragon' s unequivocal
allegation that his knee was injured when it was caught and twisted between the handles
of a tipping wheelbarrow. During the hearing, the mechanism of injury as alleged by
Mondragon was disproved. Mondragon's claim should have been dismissed at that time.
Notwithstanding the disproving of Mondragon's allegations, as well as
circumstantial evidence of a potentially fraudulent claim (which JP's was prevented from
developing into fact), the Commission proceeded to infer that Mondragon's unequivocal
assertion of a specific mechanism of injury must have been a product of confusion. Based
upon that inference of confusion, the Commission developed its own alternative theory
premised not upon the evidence, but upon assumption of how such an accident could
have happened. Notwithstanding the lack of medical support for the new theory of
accident, the medical panel was improperly relied upon to create the only medical support
for the same-upon which the award to Mondragon was ultimately based.
Mondragon gave no indication of confusion in his claims or testimony. The
inference of such confusion was unsupported and the Commission's creation, sua sponte,
of an alternative theory based thereupon was improper and deprived JP's of its right to
defend against the same. Mondragon neither raised nor supported the Commission's new
11

theory of accident, and the evidence in record offers no support therefor. The award of
benefits to Mondragon is not premised upon the claims he raised and supported, nor are
the facts thereof supported by substantial evidence. Instead, Mondragon's award is
founded upon improper assumption and advocacy by the Commission and should not be
allowed to stand.
ARGUMENT

I.

Mondragon's award of benefits is improper as it is based upon
unsupported factual findings.

Where an award made by the Labor Commission "is based upon a determination
of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence," the
award is improper and the appellate court may grant relief therefrom. 1 A showing of
substantial supporting evidence requires the existence of "more than a mere scintilla of
evidence ... though something less than the weight of the evidence. " 2 If a reasonable
mind cannot accept as adequate the evidence supporting the decision, if any, the factual
finding cannot be upheld and any order based thereupon must be reversed. 3
Here, the award of benefits to Mondragon is premised upon factual findings issued
and/or adopted by the ALJ and Commission that are based upon assumptions about how
such an accident and injury could have happened, and not upon the actual evidence
submitted by the parties during the evidentiary hearing. The award of benefits is not,
therefore, based upon the evidence submitted by Mondragon in support of his claim, but

1 Utah

Code Ann.§ 63G-4-403(4)(g)
v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42,135, 164 P.3d 384.

2 Martinez
3

Id.
12

is instead based upon inferences which lack the support of substantial evidence in the
record and information obtained through improper medical panel referrals.

A. Presentation of the factual and procedural basis underlying the
Commission's improper award of benefits to Mondragon.
i. Mondragon's allegations of how the accident occurred were
disproved at hearing.

The first evidence in the record documenting Mondragon's allegations of how the
alleged accident occurred is found in the somewhat limited medical record. Mondragon
was seen by Dr. Britt on the date of the alleged accident. 4 There he reported that he was
at work pushing a wheelbarrow that tipped to the side. Mondragon alleged that "as the
wheelbarrow tilted, the handles to[ ok] hold [of] him in different directions. This caused
pressure on his LEFT(sic) [Right] knee and he felt a sudden pop in the knee." 5
Mondragon's allegations are similarly documented in his report to Dr. Andruss
approximately a year later. 6 The dictation details Mondragon's report that he was pushing
a wheelbarrow at work which fell on its side, trapping his right knee in an external
rotation type injury. 7
Through his application for benefits filed with the Commission, Mondragon again
asserted that he sustained injury while working for JP's when his right knee was caught
by falling wheelbarrow handles. His application details the mechanism of his injury as

4

R. 220 at 30.

s Id.
6

R. 220 at 52.

7 Id.
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follows: "was carrying a full wheelbarrow and the wheelbarrow fell over, that is when it
caught my knee and injured it." 8
Mondragon provided testimony consistent with his application and those medical
reports during the evidentiary hearing before the ALJ. During his presentation of
evidence, in responding to the ALJ's questions about the alleged accident, Mondragon
unequivocally testified that as he was pushing a large wheelbarrow full of gravel, it
tipped to the right side, catching and twisting his right knee between the two handles. 9
Upon cross examination, Mondragon again affirmed his allegation that his right knee
became entrapped between the two handles of the tipping wheelbarrow. to Mondragon
offered clear testimony that as the wheelbarrow tipped to the right, his knee was caught
between the handles in a twisting motion with the handles above and below his knee, one
catching the outside of his leg and the other catching the inside. 11 Mondragon testified
that the injury to his right knee occurred "when both handles-when my knee was
between both handles, my bone popped." 12
Following his verbal testimony regarding the alleged accident, Mondragon
consented to provide an in-court physical demonstration with a similar wheelbarrow. 13
Mondragon's demonstration with the wheelbarrow showed that it was not physically
possible for the two handles of the wheelbarrow to simultaneously strike or catch any

R. at 1.
R. 221 at 14:17-25; 15:1; see "Addendum A."
10 R. 221 at 22:12-16.
11 R. 221 at 24:2-5, 10-15.
12 R. 221 at 24: 15-17.
13 R. 221 at 26:5-7.

8

9

14

location on his leg, and that the handles could not have caught and twisted his leg. 14 In
accord with JP's argument that the accident as alleged by Mondragon did not occur, the
ALJ found through the Interim Order that the physical demonstration in court proved that
"the accident could not have occurred as described [by Mondragon]." 15

ii. The ALJ and Commission assumed that Mondragon was
confused, and substituted an alternative mechanism of injury
on his behalf.
Upon the undisputed finding that Mondragon's allegations regarding how the
alleged accident and injury occurred had been disproved, the ALJ inferred that he must
have been confused about how the accident occurred. The ALJ stated that "[t]his Court
finds it easy to believe that people can be hurt and that they may be confused about the
'mechanism of injury' .... If Mr. Mondragon has a flawed recollection of the details of
the injury . . . the case can be made that an accident took place from the facts known
before and after the moment of injury." 16
The ALJ stated that although Mondragon's accident description was "flawed in
the details," she found Mondragon's testimony regarding his work day-namely, that he
was working quickly with a wheelbarrow of which he lost control and it tipped-"to be
believable and truthful," and that "Mondragon felt a pop in the knee." 17 Building upon
the assumption that Mondragon must have been confused, the ALJ found that it was
"quite clear" that Mondragon "use[ d] his legs and body to try and keep control of the

/d.
R. at 75.
16 R. at 118; see "Addendum B."
17 Id.; R. at 120.
14
15

15

wheel barrow and when the heavy load tipped he and the wheel barrow [were] jerked and
tousled." 18 In making that new finding, the ALJ did not identify any evidentiary support
therefor. Notably, neither Mondragon's unequivocal testimony nor his in-court
demonstration presented support for a finding that he attempted to maintain control of the
tipping wheelbarrow.
Upon JP's appeal to the Labor Commission, the Commission adopted the ALJ's
assumption that Mondragon must have been confused about how the injury occurred. 19
Affirming that the mechanism alleged by Mondragon could not have occurred, the
Commission noted that "even though Mr. Mondragon did not twist his right knee
between the wheelbarrow handles, he may have twisted or damaged his right knee in
another way." 20 Similar to the ALJ, the Commission found that "it is not uncommon for
an injured worker to be confused with regard to the specific action that results in an
internal injury." 21 Also like the ALJ, and although it identified no evidentiary support for
such a conclusion, the Commission stated that "established by the record is that Mr.
Mondragon's right knee was subject to stress while the fully loaded wheelbarrow tipped
over."22
Finding that the medical panel assigned by the ALJ based its finding of medical
causation (which the ALJ had adopted in awarding benefits) upon Mondragon's
disproved twisting allegation, the Commission remanded the matter to the ALJ with
R.
R.
20 R.
21 R.
22 R.
18

19

at
at
at
at
at

118.
144.
144 (emphasis added).
144.
144.
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instructions to have the panel consider the alternative theory that Mondragon's injury was
caused by the stress to which his knee was supposedly subject "while holding a full
wheelbarrow that tipped over." 23 Upon remand back to the medical panel, further factual
assumptions were made that were again adopted in awarding benefits.
Although the panel was instructed that it is bound by the facts found by the
Commission, the panel proceeded to conduct its own factual investigation, and adopted
its own findings in support of its conclusion. 24 In so doing, the panel made additional
assumptions, reportedly based upon conversation with Mondragon, that Mondragon
"tried to plant his feet to stabilize the wheelbarrow," and that in "trying to hold the
wheelbarrow from tipping . . . he straightened or bent his knee under considerable
abnormal stress."25 Characterizing the mechanism as being a "violent stressful motion
type injury," the panel again concluded that Mondragon's knee was injured by the (now
materially different) industrial accident. 26
It is clear that the purpose of medical panels before the Commission is limited to

medical examination and diagnosis. 27 A medical panel is not permitted to "encroach upon
the authority vested in the Commission to make the findings of fact." 28 However, in
conducting its own "investigation," and adopting the additional "facts" pertaining to the
injury, the panel did exactly that-going beyond the Commission's own unsupported
R. at 144.
R. at 149 (instructing the panel that it is bound by the findings of fact); R. at 152.
25 R. at 152-53.
26 R. at 153.
27 lntermountain Healthcare v. Bd. of Rev. ofIndus. Comm 'n, 839 P.2d 841, 845 n.5
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
2s 1d.
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24
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inferences regarding Mondragon's "stress" and compounding the same with its own
assertions of how such stress may have occurred. 29 Nonetheless, without taking issue
therewith, the ALJ issued a cursory order adopting the panel's conclusions (and thereby,
its improper and inadmissible factual assertions upon which its conclusions were based)
and affirmed her prior award of benefits to Mondragon. 30
Upon JP's second appeal, the Commission expanded its prior finding to state that
"the record does show that [Mondragon's] right knee was subject to significant stress" as
a result of the wheelbarrow tipping, and adopted the medical panel's opinion of medical
causation. 31 Affirming the ALJ's Order, the Commission concluded that "[a]lthough Mr.
Mondragon's mistaken description of exactly how his work injury occurred presented a
challenge in adjudicating his claim, his mistake was not fatal to his claim because the
underlying and dispositive circumstances of the accident were established in the record
even though the precise mechanism of injury was not." 32

The policies behind prohibiting panels from attempting to find their own facts are
plainly evident, and are implicated in this case. When additional "facts" are found by a
panel-especially when they are contrary to the evidence established during the
hearing-respondents have no way of determining the veracity of such facts, and are
robbed of the opportunity to challenge and/or develop the same through cross
examination.
30 R. at 159.
31 R. at 203-04 (emphasis added); see "Addendum C."
32 R. at 204.
29
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B. The inference that that Mondragon was confused was unreasonable
and unsupported.

As the finder of fact, the Labor Commission is required to view all the evidence as
a whole, and then make an appropriate determination of the facts established thereby. 33
The Commission may draw reasonable inferences from the facts established at hearing,
but it may not base its award of benefits upon an arbitrary choice between two equally
reasonable inferences. "If, therefore, two different inferences may be deduced, one of
which authorizes the award and the other not, and both inferences are equally reasonable,
the Commission may not arbitrarily disregard one of the inferences and choose the other.
In such circumstances the inferences meet and destroy each other, and neither has any
probative force or effect. " 34 If the Commission makes an award on the basis of such a
choice between inferences, the award is improper as it lacks support in the evidence and
is unlawful as it creates liability without any legal evidence in support thereof. 35
Here, as presented above, the ALJ and Commission's award of benefits to
Mondragon is premised upon their adoption of the inference that because Mondragon's
story was disproved, he must have been confused or mistaken about how it happened.
This inference was adopted to the exclusion of the opposing inference that Mondragon's
story was not a product of confusion or mistake, but fabrication. Although the

Johnston v. Labor Comm 'n, 2013 UT App 179 ,i 24, 307 P.3d 615 ("It is the province
of the [Commission], as the finder of fact, to view all the evidence submitted as a whole
and then make an appropriate determination.").
34 Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm 'n, 58 Utah 608, 614, 201 P. 173, 175 (Utah
1921).
35 Id.
33
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Commission asserted that support for its assumptions and ultimate award exists in the
record, this is not the case.
The question is, given the available evidence, was there sufficient support for the
assumption that Mondragon was confused, or was it equally reasonable to infer that
Mondragon's story was fabricated and could not support an award of benefits? There is in
fact, no evidence of confusion and JP's contends that based upon the available evidence,
and the evidence JP's sought to obtain on the veracity of Mondragon's claim, it was
actually more reasonable to reject Mondragon's story as a fabrication and find that no
accident occurred.
The Commission asserted that its award was proper since the underlying factual
bases were evident from the record. The Commission contended that "[w]hile the exact
mechanism of injury is somewhat uncertain ... it is not uncommon for an injured worker
to be unclear about a specific exertion that leads to an internal injury ... the record does
show that his right knee was subject to significant stress while carrying a fully loaded
wheelbarrow that tipped over. " 36 However, the record is devoid of evidence pertaining to
"significant stress" upon Mondragon' s knee. 37
In determining that the tip-over event caused "significant stress" the Commission
assumed the existence of facts not in evidence pertaining to Mondragon's assumed efforts
to stop the wheelbarrow from tipping. Although it may be assumed that a person might
R. at 203 (internal quotes omitted).
JP's does not dispute that Mondragon was working with a wheelbarrow on the date of
the accident, and that his knee would have been subject to some level of stress imposed
by normally operating such a device-but Mondragon never asserted that such stress
caused the injury.

36
37
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try to regain control of a tipping wheelbarrow, Mondragon made no such allegation in
this matter, and submitted no evidence in support of such a finding. Instead, Mondragon's
presentation of evidence was offered solely in support of his single unchanging allegation
that his knee was injured when it was caught and twisted between the handles of the
falling wheelbarrow. 38
Mondragon made no allegation that he expended any effort whatsoever to prevent
the wheelbarrow from tipping. He simply alleged that when the wheelbarrow "tipped to
the side" the handles caught and twisted his knee, causing the injury. 39 Mondragon's
testimony stands in stark contrast to the ultimate findings adopted by the Commission,
which relied upon the presence of significant effort by Mondragon to regain control of
the tipping wheelbarrow.

40

It was unreasonable for the Commission to assume the

existence of significant stress during the supposed injury event when the circumstances
and Mondragon's testimony did not support such an inference.
However, and more importantly, without first making the assumption that
Mondragon was confused or mistaken, the Commission could not have reached the
assumption of the alternative "significant stress" theory of injury. Mondragon's
testimony shows that he was not confused or mistaken. Instead, Mondragon presented his

R. 221 at
R. 221 at 20: 18-25.
40 As noted above, this inference of "significant effort" was largely created by the
medical panel through its improper intrusion into the fact finding authority of the ALJ,
wherein it unilaterally accepted as true its assumptions that Mondragon made significant
efforts to prevent the wheelbarrow from tipping, and based its conclusions upon the
same.
38

39
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story in a clear and unequivocal manner, with no indication that he was unsure, or that he
couldn't remember how the injury occurred.
Mondragon testified briefly, but in a detailed and specific manner about the
alleged mechanism during his direct testimony. Although Mondragon appeared pro se,
the ALJ handled his direct testimony in a question and answer format, eliciting the details
about the alleged accident which she deemed important to his claim. In responding to the
ALJ's questions, Mondragon testified that the wheelbarrow "tipped to the side and it
caught his knee. Which knee? This one, the right one. The handles caught in my knee.
Tell me what happened then. Okay, so my knee was caught between the two handleshandles, and I felt my knee popping."41 Likewise on cross examination, Mondragon was
unwavering, testifying that one handle caught the outside of his right leg, above the knee,
and the other caught the inside, three to four inches below the knee, and "when both
handles-when my knee was between both handles, my bone popped."42
The Commission stated that it is "not uncommon" for injured workers to be
unclear or mistaken about the mechanism of their injury. JP's does not dispute that this is
likely the case. Indeed, if Mondragon would have indicated that he was confused about,
or that he couldn't remember exactly how the accident happened, JP's would likely agree
to the propriety of assuming that an injury occurred just based upon the allegations that
he was working and something happened with the wheelbarrow that caused him injury.
Such is not the case here. Mondragon presented a uniform and very specific story, which

R. 221 at 14: 17-25.
42 R. 221 at 24: 2-16.
41
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ultimately was shown to be false. The simple fact that he was wrong, does not necessarily
lead to the assumption that he was confused.
JP's contends that Mondragon presented a fabricated story in order to obtain a
fraudulent award of benefits. However, as addressed below, JP's was prevented from
obtaining necessary evidence on that issue, which may have resulted in referral of this
case for a fraud investigation. In any event, it is not surprising that Mondragon chose the
accident theory he presented to the Commission. At first blush, it does appear to be
possible and sounds to be quite traumatic in nature-likely consistent, from a layperspective, with a knee injury such as Mondragon's. Even the ALJ, prior to the physical
demonstration that proved its impossibility, stated that she had no problem visualizing the
event, noting "I can see how this could happen. I've had a wheelbarrow tip on me ....
It's not at all difficult to understand." 43 Nonetheless, upon demonstration, Mondragon's
story was disproved and he offered no indication that he was confused, mistaken, or that
some alternative mechanism existed.
The Commission contends that its assumption of confusion and assertion of an
alternative accident theory is reasonable due to its acceptance as true that Mondragon was
working with a wheelbarrow that tipped, reported an injury, and received timely medical
treatment. 44 Again, JP's does not dispute that Mondragon was working with the
wheelbarrow, or that he offered a subjective report of popping and injury. These facts
make it no more or less likely that he was confused versus lying. The timely medical
R. 221 at 24: 20-25; 25: 1-5.
R. at 203 (noting these are the circumstances upon which the prior decisions from the
ALJ and Commission were based).

43

44
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treatment upon which the Commission relies actually supports the argument that
Mondragon had the knee injury before he began his employment at JP's.
On the date of the accident, Mondragon was seen by Dr. Britt. 45 On inspection, Dr.
Britt found the knee to be "normal in appearance" with "no visible bruising."46 Dr. Britt
did note some tenderness, and that "[t]here may be slight swelling above the joint line
medially," and assessed a right knee sprain. 47 Thus, at the medical examination most
contemporaneous to the accident, which should have yielded the most evidence in
support of this alleged "significant" mechanism and injury, Mondragon's knee appeared
normal in appearance. There was possibly slight swelling present, however, in describing
the nature of symptoms in individuals with chronic meniscal injuries, the medical panel
noted that "[r]ecurrent swelling is the rule not the exception."48 Thus, it is equally likely
that if there was slight swelling present on exam, it may have been recurrent from a prior
injury, as opposed to acutely caused by an accident at JP's.
JP's contends that the opposite assumption is more reasonable when the opposing
evidence is considered. JP's identified that evidence to the Commission, including the
fact that Mondragon was allegedly injured within hours of starting his employment with
JP's, 49 through an alleged accident that was unwitnessed and that proved to be physically
impossible. Mondragon's prolific and questionable claims history whereby he and his
adult son demonstrated a history of multiple prior claims at the same successive
R. 220 at 30.
Jd.
47 Id.
48 R. at 153.
49 R. 221 at 20:10.

45

46
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employers is further support for viewing Mondragon's claim with skepticism. 50 Likewise,
following the alleged injury with JP's, and without receiving any substantive treatment
for his alleged knee condition, Mondragon demonstrated the ability to return to heavy
labor work like that performed at JP's, which supports inference that he was capable of
beginning work with JP's notwithstanding a then-current injury. 51
Although JP's contends that there is no evidentiary support for the inference of
confusion, and ample support for the opposite inference, at minimum the two inferences
must be viewed as equally reasonable as being the two possible explanations for
Mondragon's false story. The Commission is prohibited from arbitrarily choosing to
believe that Mondragon was confused in order to award benefits. 52 Nonetheless, that is
precisely what occurred. Because the available inferences are, at minimum, equally
reasonable, neither may be adopted as a basis for an order as they are deemed to lack
evidentiary support. 53
Because the inferences that Mondragon was either confused or lying "meet and
destroy each other," we are left with the simple undisputed fact that Mondragon pled and
relied upon an accident theory that did not occur. In so doing, Mondragon failed to prove
the first necessary element of his accident claim-that the industrial accident did in fact

so R. at 180-198.
R. at 201; see also R. 200 at 64, p.2 (discussing Mondragon's subsequent
employment).
52 Spring Canyon Coal Co., 58 Utah at 614.
53 Jd.
51
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occur. 54 Mondragon's claim should have been dismissed at that time, and the
Commission erred in failing to do so. This Court should remedy that error.
C. The alternative theory of Mondragon 's accident lacks medical
support and therefore does not satisfy medical causation.
To sustain an award of benefits, an injured worker must prove that the accident is
the medical cause of his injury. 55 Such a showing requires that the worker prove that his
injury is medically caused by the workplace accident. 56 Medical causation is an issue of
fact, and the Commission's determination will be upheld only if it is adequately
supported by the record. 57 Here, as outlined above, Mondragon did not assert the accident
theory upon which his award was ultimately based, and did not proffer evidence or
argument in support thereof. In any event, if the errors in presenting and adopting the
alternative accident theory are overlooked, it nonetheless fails to meet the requirements
of medical causation.
The treatment records in evidence, upon which Mondragon relied as medical
support for his claim, document that they were all premised upon the existence of the
twisting mechanism alleged by Mondragon. In the first treatment record, Dr. Britt details
the mechanism upon which his examination and diagnosis are based. He documents that
Mondragon reported that his knee was injured when "pushing a wheelbarrow ... and as
the wheelbarrow tilted, the handles to[ ok] hold [ofJ him in different directions" which

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(1) (requiring proof of an injury "by accident").
Allen v. Indus. Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 1986).
56 Chase v. Indus. Comm 'n, 872 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
51 Id.
54
55
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caused pressure on and a pop in the knee. 58 Likewise, the other treating physician, Dr.
Andruss, documented that his care was also based upon Mondragon's allegations. His
record demonstrates that Mondragon reported that the "wheelbarrow fell," trapping his
right knee in a "rotation type injury."59
None of the medical records were premised upon the "significant stress" theory
ultimately put forth and adopted by the ALJ and Commission. Instead, all Mondragon's
treatment and recommendations were based upon his report to the physicians that his
knee had been twisted between the handles of the falling wheelbarrow. Because that
theory was disproved, Mondragon' s medical support for that theory was invalidated and
he lacked medical support for any other theory of accident. Nonetheless, the ALJ
determined that conflicting medical opinions regarding medical causation existed, and
referred the matter to the medical panel for evaluation. 60 Upon JP's challenge of the
referral, the Commission concluded that "there was sufficient evidence of a work injury
and conflicting opinions with regard to its medical cause to refer the issue to a medical
panel."61
JP's does not dispute that the medical records initially demonstrated a dispute as to
the medical cause of Mondragon's injury. However, that dispute was premised wholly
upon the presumption of Mondragon's physicians that the mechanism he reported had
actually occurred. Because Mondragon's reported mechanism did not occur, those same

R.
R.
60 R.
61 R.

58

59

220 at 30.
220 at 52.
at 76.
at 203.
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medical records were rendered foundationless and cannot be relied upon as support for an
alternative accident theory which the physicians did not consider in reaching their
conclusions.
Although the medical panel ultimately provided support for the ALJ and
Commission's alternative accident theory, such support cannot be relied upon as it was
obtained through an improper referral and, as explained above, an improper medical
panel process wherein the panel adopted its own new "facts" as the basis for its opinions.
The Labor Commission's rules mandate that to qualify for submission to a medical panel,
a significant medical dispute must be present that is demonstrated by "[ c]onflicting
medical opinions related to causation of the injury or disease." 62 In short, the medical
panel cannot create medical support where none exists, but can only weigh-in on disputes
already in evidence.
Here, there was no medical dispute regarding whether the alternative accident
theory was the medical cause of Mondragon's injuries, because the medical evidence in
the record wholly failed to address such a mechanism. In referring the matter to the
medical panel, the ALJ and Commission improperly shoehorned the existing medical
evidence to fit their substitute theory, and proceeded to rely upon the medical panel to
create the only medical evidence in support thereof. This circular method is a
fundamentally improper use of the medical panel as its function is not to create medical

62

Utah Admin. Code R602-2-2(A).
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support or disputes, but to address conflicts between already existing medical evidence. 63
Because no medical support existed for the alternative accident theory, there was no
justification for a referral to the medical panel to obtain the same. The Commission's
decision, based upon the Panel's conclusion that the alternative accident theory caused
Mondragon's injury, is therefore improper and cannot be upheld. Mondragon's claim
should have been dismissed for failure to establish medical causation.
II.

JP's was improperly
Mondragon's claim.

denied

discovery

into

the

veracity

of

Discovery in workers' compensation cases permits the parties to inquire into all
matters "relevant to the claims and defenses at issue in the case." 64 As alluded to above,
during the discovery process, JP' s attempted to obtain additional evidence on whether
Mondragon's claim was fraudulent in nature. In conducting our preliminary investigation
into Mondragon's claim history, a claims history report was generated which included a
broad search to discover any aliases, misspellings, similar names, etc. 65 Upon receipt of
that report, it became apparent to JP's that Mondragon and his adult son had
demonstrated a pattern of filing numerous prior workers' compensation claims at the
same successive prior employers.
The claims pattern evidenced by the report, based upon the claims professional's
and counsel's wealth of experience in reviewing such reports, raised credible suspicion of
See Martinez v. Dakota Mills & Cabinets, 2008 UT Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 9, 4 (Feb 22,
2008 Order Affirming ALJ's Decision, Case No. 06-0972) (Labor Commission
acknowledging that a medical panel cannot be used to create medical evidence or
disputes where none exists).
64 Utah Admin. Code R. 602-2-l(F)(l).
65 R. at 179-98.
63
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fraud. This, combined with the facts that Mondragon was allegedly injured within hours
of beginning his employment with JP's in an unwitnessed accident, and had demonstrated
the ability to work notwithstanding the alleged injury through his return to similar
employment, led JP's to seek additional discovery in an effort to determine whether a
referral of Mondragon' s claim for a fraud investigation was indicated.
JP's notified the Labor Commission of our suspicion of fraud early in the
discovery process, 66 and submitted requests to Mondragon for authorization from his
adult son and wife to obtain records pertaining to their claims history. 67 Mondragon
refused to respond to JP's discovery efforts, and in ruling on JP's Motion to Compel, the
ALJ refused to allow discovery regarding Mondragon's wife and son, stating that there
had been no showing of relevancy and that the court lacked jurisdiction.68
Although JP's did have a strong suspicion of fraud in this case, it is not common
practice to turn over cases to the Attorney General's office for investigation without
substantial evidence of the same. Due to the ALJ's refusal to allow further discovery on
the issue, JP's was unable to obtain that evidence. However, because it became apparent
to JP's that Mondragon's alleged mechanism of injury was impossible, JP's proceeded on
that defense as the lack of proof an accident alone should have been sufficient to obtain a
dismissal ofMondragon's claim
Upon receiving the ALJ's and Commission's Orders, which assumed confusion
and created a new theory of accident not asserted or supported by Mondragon, JP's again
R. at 23.
R. at 28.
68 R. at 63.
66
67
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argued that the discovery which it initially sought on credibility and fraud was wholly
relevant, now more than before, and that it must now be allowed. 69 In denying JP's
Motion for a remand to allow the discovery, the Commission stated that JP's had
submitted "no actual evidence of fraud on Mr. Mondragon's part," and that "JP's
assertion that Mr. Mondragon is not credible and may be committing fraud is no more
than speculation without evidence of actual fraud." 70
JP's contends that the Commission's ruling amounts to an abuse of discretion.
Essentially, in denying JP's request for discovery, the Commission held that because JP's
had not submitted the very evidence on fraud and credibility that JP 's sought to obtain

through the requested discovery, it would not remand to allow the necessary discovery. It
simultaneously prevented JP's from obtaining the necessary evidence on fraud and
credibility while penalizing JP' s for not obtaining and submitting the same. It is the
speculation of fraud, based upon the circumstantial evidence outlined above, that JP's
sought to support through the requested discovery. Although the Commission deemed
appropriate to base its decision upon speculation, it dismissed JP's speculation of fraud as
insufficient to even justify further discovery to develop the facts thereof. Nonetheless,
JP's speculation of fraud casts additional doubt upon the Commission's assumption of
Mondragon' s confusion. -The Commission's decision lacks foundation in logic and
deprived JP's of its rights to conduct discovery into this centrally relevant matter. This
Court should, at minimum, correct the Commission's improper ruling on this issue.

R. at 207.
70 R. at 21 7; see "Addendum D."
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III.

The ALJ and Commission improperly advocated on Mondragon's
behalf in creating a new theory of accident.

Utah's approach to pro se litigants "seeks to balance the procedural demands of
litigation and the rights of unrepresented parties." 71 Thus, while an occasional
"procedural misstep" may be tolerated without sanction, an unrepresented party is "held
to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar" and
it is impermissible for the court to advocate on their behalf. 72 Ultimately, "if a litigant, for
whatever reason, sees fit to rely on himself as counsel, he must be prepared to accept the
consequences of his mistakes and errors." 73 This Court has further confirmed that it is
improper for the Commission to enter an award based upon an accident theory not pled or
presented by the applicant. 74
Here, the Commission made clear that because of Mondragon's pro se status, it
was willing to overlook the so-called "mistakes" in his claim. The Commission
documented its theory that "an injured worker, especially one who is unrepresented like
Mr. Mondragon, may make a mistake regarding an aspect of his or her claim" and that
the Commission could nonetheless remedy that mistake for him based upon its view of
the evidence. Where, as here, Mondragon's "mistake" was to concoct an impossible
theory of how he was injured in order to receive workers' compensation benefits, JP's
contends that such a mistake cannot be overlooked. Nor can it be remedied, sua sponte,

State v. Burdick, 2014 UT App 34, ,r 25, 320 P.3d 55.
72 Id.
73 Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1220 (Hall, Chief Justice: concurring and
dissenting opinion) (Utah 1983).
74 Acosta v. Labor Comm 'n, 2002 UT App 67, ,r,r 31-33, 44 P.3d 819.
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by the Commission. In asserting an alternate theory of accident on behalf of Mondragon,
the Commission crossed into prohibited advocacy in violation of JP's due process rights.
As has been thoroughly established above, Mondragon's sole allegation regarding
his injury is that the handles of the falling wheelbarrow twisted and injured his right knee.
Once that theory was disproved, Mondragon did not make a single effort to advocate in
his own behalf-notwithstanding JP's challenges. Indeed, although JP's filed several
motions, objections, and appeals before the Labor Commission, not once did Mondragon
respond. Instead, the ALJ and Commission, acting on their own volition, stepped in to
assert that not only was Mondragon confused about how the accident must have
happened (although he gave no indication of confusion) but to assert an alternative
accident theory on his behalf (which Mondragon never raised or supported).
In Acosta, this Court held that it is error for the Commission to base an award
upon an accident theory not asserted by the applicant, but instead by the ALJ. 75 The
applicant in Acosta had relied solely upon an accident theory involving one specific
instance of lifting an eight pound baby from its crib as being the cause of her injury. 76
The ALJ acknowledged that the one specific lift relied upon by the applicant would not
support an award of benefits, and then proceeded, sua sponte, relying upon his view of
the evidence in the case, to expand the applicant's accident theory to include 40 lifts

75
76

Acosta, 2002 UT App 67, ,i,i 31-33.
Id. at 33.
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throughout the day, along with other various exertions, and found that the same were
sufficient to justify an award. 77
On review below, the Commission reversed the award to Acosta, holding that the
applicant had "relied on a single, specific work activity" as the cause for her injury, and
that it was "inappropriate for either the ALJ or the Commission to raise other theories ...
to justify an award of benefits." 78 This Court, on appeal, agreed that the Commission
acted correctly in reversing the award, holding that it was "improper" for the ALJ to raise
the expanded theory of the accident on its own, because it denied the respondents the
opportunity to defend against the new theory. 79 Holding that because the applicant failed
to raise the alternative accident theory on her own, she could not rely upon it, this Court
affirmed the denial of benefits. 80
In asserting the alternative "significant stress" theory of accident for Mondragon,
the Commission deprived JP's of the opportunity to defend against the same.
Mondragon's allegations regarding the accident, as detailed above, consistently pointed
only at the twisting-between-the-wheelbarrow-handles mechanism. As detailed above,
Monragon' s reports in the medical evidence were likewise consistent with his single
theory of accident. JP's had no notice or reason to prepare a defense based upon some
alternative theory that was neither asserted by Mondragon nor supported by the evidence.
Nonetheless, just as the ALJ did in Acosta, the Commission and ALJ here presented, sua

Id. at 31.
Id.
79 Id. at 33.
so Id.
77
78
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sponte, an alternative theory of accident which Mondragon did not raise or support, and
premised its award of benefits thereupon. Like the award in Acosta, the Commission's
award here is improper.
The Commission asserted that it was not improper for it to "advance an alternative
theory of the accident," since it was well-established in the records. To the contrary, as
shown above, there exists no evidentiary support for the "significant stress" theory put
forth by the Commission. In any event, JP's contends that whatever level of leniency is
afforded to pro se litigants, the Commission exceeded that grant in stepping into the
shoes of Mondragon's counsel by asserting alternative accident theories on his behalf
which formed the basis for its award. The Commission did not overlook some minor
procedural misstep. Instead, it excused Mondragon from his obligation to prove a
necessary element of his claim and improperly awarded benefits on a theory which
Mondragon did not assert, the evidence did not support, and against which JP' s had no
opportunity to defend. The Commission's actions were improper and should not be
allowed to form the basis for a finding of liability against JP's.
CONCLUSION
The Commission's award of benefits in this matter cannot be upheld as it is based
upon inference and assumption not founded in the evidence, and upon improper actions
by the Commission on Mondragon's behalf. Upon completion of the evidentiary hearing,
all facts in this matter, including Mondragon's own pleadings, testimony, demonstration,
and the medical evidence, pointed only to the twisting mechanism alleged by Mondragon.
Once that mechanism was disproved, the Commission assumed, without evidentiary
35

support, that Mondragon was confused and based thereupon proceeded, sua sponte, to
create an alternate accident theory and improperly relied upon the medical panel to
provide support therefor. In the process, JP' s was deprived of the opportunity to defend
against the Commission's new theory, including through completion of relevant
discovery. The Commission's award is contrary to the evidence in record and is a product
of improper actions on Mondragon' s behalf by the ALJ and Commission. It cannot be
allowed to stand. This Court should reverse.
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ALBERTO MONDRAGON

Examination by the Court
Cross-Examination by Mr. Kesler
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E X H I B I T s

No.

Description

J-1

Medical record

P-1

Initial summary by Dr. Andrus

Disc'd

Rec'd

6

6

13

N/R

~

<..,

I
!

!

!

.l

i

2

i

l

$:

June 12~

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

3

i .,
;

I
I

9:00 a.m.

2013

THE COURT:

I'll call to order (tape skipped}

4

JP's Landscaping and/or Auto Owners Insurance Company.

5

This is Labor Commission case No. 12-0664.

6

June 12, 2013, approximately 9:00 a.m.

7

date and time set for the hearing in this matter.

8

It's

This is the

Would counsel for Respondents please state

·i

9

10
11
12
13

his appearance?
MR. KESLER:

Cody Kesler, and that's

K-E-S-L-E-R.
THE COURT:

Thank you, sir.

Will

Mr. Mondragon be representing himself today?

14

MR. MONDRAGON:

'
.i

15

THE COURT:

IJ&'. ·II

16

you as my interpreter, so if you could come and stand

17

here at the podium.

i'

Oh-huh.

Okay.

I'm going to first swear

,I

;. l
i '

.I

~-

18

Would you state your name?

19

INTERPRETER:

20

:j

21
22

I.@

Patty McCoy, M-C-C-O-Y,

P-A-T-T-Y.
THE COURT:

Ma'am, would you please raise

your right hand?

' I

; I
~-__J

j

!

_,j)

,,

i

,

23

Do you swear that you will fully and truly,

24

to the best of your ability, interpret the English

25

language to the Spanish language and the Spanish
3

.1

1

language to the English language in today's

2

proceeding?

3

INTERPRETER:

4

THE COURT:

I do.

i

•I

. '!

talk too fast or you're having a hard time,

6

your hand--

7

INTEPRETER:

8

THE COURT:

9

10

j

get caught up.

just raise

Okay.
--and we'll stop and--and let you

I want Mr. Mondragon to know

everything that's going on.

11

INTERPRETER:

12

THE COURT:

Thank you.
I think there are--is at least

13

one preliminary evidentiary history--item regarding

14

the medical records exhibit.

15

Mr. Kesler?

16

MR. KESLER:

17

THE COURT:

18

1

And please, if we

5

.I

.!i

Thank you.

Is that right,

That's correct.
Would you like me to take that up

at this time?

19

MR. KESLER:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. KESLER:

Please.
Okay.
Yes.

What is it?
Just this morning--a few

let's see, on May 1st, Mr. Mondragon was

22

months--well,

23

seen by Cr. Fotheringham for an IME.

24

communication to Dr. Fotheringham for the past couple

25

of days.

And we were in

We just received his report at 8:30 this

4

:.

.

~

1

morning, as it was faxed here.

2

now.
I'm happy to--you know, if we can take a

3
:

We have copies of that

·,

! -~

4

recess and let Mr. Mondragon review it with the

5

interpreter, so that he's aware of--of the findings of

6

the report, that--

.... l

THE COURT:

7

8

been done.

10
.,

11

That's why we (inaudible).

M~. KESLER:

9

I thought that would already have

THE COURT:

It happens.
Yes, you need to give

Mr. Mondragon a copy .

t
;

MR. KESLER:

12

13

Here's a copy of this.

And--and

may I approach?
THE COURT:

14

Yes.

This is the report from

I

~

: -·!

15

Dr. Fotheringham that saw you for the insurance

il II

16

company.

17

medical records.

18

the records?

l..J

u
;l
.

I

.__J

!; Ii
L._j

It's being proposed that it be added to the
Do you object to that being added to

19

THE WITNESS:

20

THE COURT:

Yes, you can add them.
Okay.

Where I propose to add

21

them would be at the end, which would make this page

22

64, consecutively to the end.

23

com.~ent on that numbering?

24

MR. KESLER:

25

THE COURT:

Does anyone have a

That appears appropriate.
Okay.

So starting with page 64.
5

1

I am not going to take time to number each page right

2

now.

I'll have my clerk do it later.

3

With the addition of this record, do you know

4

of any other additions, deletions or modifications

5

that need to be made to the medical records exhibit,

6

Mr. Kesler?
MR. KESLER:

7
• I

!

·;

8

Dr. Fotheringham was all that I had additional.
THE COURT:

9

10

.. \

THE WITNESS:

THE COURT:

One was sent to me, but

Okay.

Does he have any objection

to this coming into evidence as Joint Exhibit l?

15
16

Yes.

because I can't read English, then I did not read it.

13
14

Ask Mr. Mondragon if he has seen

the medical records exhibit .

11
12

No, just the record from

THE WITNESS:

Yes,

I--I agree that it has to

be added.

17

THE COORT:

Okay.

Then this will be marked

·J

18

Joint Exhibit 1 and become part of the evidentiary

.I

19

record.

20

the end .

.

\

21

And that's with the addition of the report at

Mr. Mondragon, have you ever participated in

I

.• J

22

a hearing or proceeding such as'this, or seen one?

.J

23

THE WITNESS:

l

24

THE COURT:

.I
j

25

No.
The way we proceed is it's your

case, so you have to prove your case.

You can do that
6

i,

I

~1

!

1

by testifying, calling witnesses, and/or sometimes

:
! i

.

2

just relying on the medical records.

...
..

3

chance to make an opening statement to tell me what

4

your case is about, briefly, and then the other side

5

can make an opening statement.

6

actually put on evidence.

7

be placed under oath and will have to be cross-

8

examined.

.

:·

~1

You'll get a

,.

!

i

,I

~, I

Anyone that testifies will

At the end of the proceeding, you get to make

9

! .

And then we'll

10

a closing argument.

And because it's your case and

11

you have the burden of proof, you get to make a final

12

rebuttal closing argument, too.

13

last word.

You get the first and

j

·1

14

THE WITNESS:

15

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

!

:-.1
'

'

16

;· l

an opening statement at this time?

17

THE WITNESS:

18

THE COURT:

19

I@:

Would Mr. Mondragon like to make

Uh-huh.
Okay.

And you can stand, sit,

come up, it's whatever you're comfortable with.
THE WITNESS:

20

Yes.

I just wanted to let you

I

21

know that the insurance, maybe for about a year now,

u

22

has not approved anything to have my leg checked.

23

Yes.

:I

24

knee was fractured and I was in a lot of pain, and I

25

never was able to see a doctor or get any medication.

.... I

i,riJ

:

~

It was for about one year that I had rny--that my

I

L.l

7

1
2

THE COURT:

like to say at this time?

3

THE WITNESS:

l

5

I still had to go and get a job and work, even with my

6

injured knee.

7

home.

8

didn't work, even in these conditions, then no one--I

9

would not be able to support my family.

And I am the only one who works at

My wife doesn't work, she's not well.

THE COURT:

And if I

Part of his claim is for missed

11

days of work.

12

able to work due to his knee, in his opinion?

Can he tell me how many days he was not

THE WITNESS:

Okay.

From the time of the

14

injury until about July 15th, the doctor that saw me

15

at the clinic checked my knee and told me that I could

16

go back to work.

17

give to the employer so she could give me light duty.

18

And the employer, instead of giving me light duty, she

19

fired me.

20

for me.

21

J

And because they would

not have me go see a doctor and I needed to work, then

13

'

Yes.

4

10

j

Is there anything else he would

The doctor gave me some paperwork to

She told me that she had no light-duty work

And I don't know what your opinion would be

22

on that, if that was right or wrong.

23

should have--the employer should have given me some

24

light duty.

25

THE COURT:

I think she

So he was injured on May 22nd,
8

-~

I

-'!'

~1

i

1

2012.

2

but light duty from May 22nd, 2012 to July 15th, 2012?

3

i

j

THE WITNESS:

¼9:

5

She did not want to give me any light-duty work.

6

the doctor told me that I was disabled, but I still

7

was able to go to work.

8

this paperwork?
THE COURT:

THE WITNESS:

12

THE COURT:

14

iI

But

And would you like to see

He can make that part of his

case.

11

13

..

On that date, on July

15th, the doctor told me that I could go back to work.

10

H

Okay.

4

9

I

So is he saying that he could not do anything

Oh-huh.
Okay.

Does he have anything else

to say to me in an opening statement?
THE WITNESS:

Yes.

And--well, that's it,

15

except that I would like you to make sure that I get

16

paid for those days, because I got injured at work,

17

didn't get injured at home.

18

THE COURT:

Okay.

I

That's a good opening

19

statement.

20

it's--in a minute, but now we'll let Respondents make

21

their opening statement.

22

And he has to then put on proof when

MR. KESLER:

Thank you.

In this--in this

23

claim, Petitioner--he claims he sustained an injury on

24

May 22nd, which was his first day of employment with

25

this employer, when a wheelbarrow tipped over, the
9

1

opposing handles catching in his legs.

2

have been some issues with the description of the

3

accident that we'll have to flesh out through

4

examination today.

5

i

'

.l

the claim is for TTD

6

from the date of injury to July 16th, 2012, which was

7

his return to work date.

8

claimed at the time of the application, was to be

9

determined, but I'm assuming it would be per

10

11

J

As Petitioner mentioned,

There--there

Recommended medical, he

Dr. Andrus's report.
Petitioner mentioned he hasn't,

in the last

12

year, seen any treating physicians.

13

of this year, May 7th, he was evaluated by Dr. Andrus

14

for an orthopedic evaluation.

15

Initially,

Just in--in May

this claim was denied due to

16

some--some difficulties in cooperation on the part of

17

Petitioner in authorizing the adjuster in this matter

18

to obtain medical records when she became aware of

19

previous right-knee injuries.

20

subsequently issued on that ground.

21

And so the denial was

Based on the IME of Dr.

Fotheringham that

22

we--we just admitted,

it's clear that this--the

J

23

medical aspects of this case are going to have to go

!

24

to a panel.

25

within a reasonable medical probability that

I

.I

Dr.

Fotheringham states that it's not

10

1

Petitioner's current symptoms were due to the

2

industrial accident, that the industrial accident was

3

merely a temporary aggravation, and that ongoing

4

treatment is not justified on the basis of the

5

industrial accident.
So the panel will have to evaluate causation,

6

I

·!. ..,-:
~

'1'

I

7

both initial and of the current symptoms, or at least

8

after July 16th, 2012, when he was released, as well

9

as future treatment.

10

there are some--some issues with the mechanism of

11

injury that we'll have to flesh out.

12

we'll--we'll submit it to begin.

13

vii

i ·1

L.

COURT:

But with that,

Mr. Kesler--and I--I'm sorry, I

14

usually leave a note here and I--I didn't.

15

opposing or did you deny the wage that was listed in

16

the application?
MR. KESLER:

18

Are you

With the wage--as I mentioned,

it was--

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. KESLER:

It's paragraph 6.
--it was Petitioner's first day.

21

The hourly wage we don't dispute.

22

hours, I guess we just have to assume that it was

!

23

going to be 40.

l
:_J

24

THE COORT:

25

MR. KESLER:

I

!..

I.id

THE

17

r· I
I. .I
L.I

And as I mentioned, there are--

The--the weekly

We don't have--

So really, it's not in dispute?
(Inaudible.)
11

VJ)

...

1
2

THE COURT:

MR. KESLER:

4

THE COURT:

THE WITNESS:

"!

Do you agree with that,

Yes.

Yes, but r--I got injured

7

the first day, but that's what he told me, that he was

8

going to have me work 40 hours a week-THE COURT:

9

.. I

Right.

Mr. Mondragon?

6

.I

It

would be $12 an hour, 40 hours a week?

3

5

So wage is not in dispute.

10

THE WITNESS:

11

THE COURT:

Thank you.
--at 12.
Thank you.

Mr. Mondragon, this

12

is the time for you to put on your case.

13

giving testimony under oath today?

14

THE WITNESS:

15

THE COURT:

Will you be

Yes.
And that paper that you want me

16

to have, why don't you bring that with you?

17

can stand anywhere you'd like that makes it easier for

18

you.

19

And you

Mr. Mondragon, if you'll come here and raise

!

20

.I
.I

J

.I

your right hand.

I can take·the paper.

21

(The witness was sworn.)

22

THE WITNESS:

23

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

Okay.

Thank you .

Yes.

Thank you.

We need to

24

record everything, so speak out loud.

The microphone

25

won't make your voice louder, it just records.

I'd
12

.I

•.!

,-:

1

like you to have a seat here while you testify.

i

2

will mark this paper as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.

And I

I

!

Mr. Kesler, do you want to come look at this?

3

4

You probably have already seen

5

initial summary from his first visit.
MR. KESLER:

6
7

just verify.

8

exhibit.

Looks like the

that should be--let me

That should be in the medical records

THE COURT:

9

Yeah,

'-1-

J_ :.. •

It might be, so ...

. i

i
i

10

MR. KESLER:

11

THE COURT:

12

THE INTERPRETER:

THE COURT:

16

THE INTERPRETER:

.

[
I

.·.~,J

Your Honor, if it's okay

You certainly can.
It will be easier for me

to--

18

THE COURT:

19

THE INTERPRETER:

20

THE COURT:

21

Go ahead and have a

with the Court, may I just roll that chair over here?

15

17

l

All right.

seat here.

13

14

Let me just check that.

Yes.
--connect with him.

Mr. Kesler, do you mind helping

with setting up--

22

MR; KESLER:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. KESLER:

25

THE INTERPRETER:

You bet.
--this area?
Yes.

Sorry.
Thank you.
13

THE COURT:

1

,t I.
•

I

; 1

2

. ..

;

i.

!

~

I'd run down

to do it, but then you'd all realize how short I am.
ALBERTO MONDRAGON,

3

I

i

L.I

Thank you so much.

4

having been first duly sworn, was

5

examined and testified as follows:

I

EXAMINATION

6
7

!

I

BY THE COURT:

Q

8

Mr. Mondragon, could you tell me how the

1.

9

accident happened?

10

A

Okay.

What happened at that time, we were

11

using wheelbarrows to empty--no.

12

wheelbarrows that had gravel in it.

ii

13

finish the job really quickly, so he had us work

,I

14

really fast.

: I

15

fl

16

the wheel--as we were--as we were pushing the--the

17

wheelbarrow.

18

to the side--tipped to the side and it caught his

19

knee.

I

We were emptying
And we wanted to

I

!·J
1-.1I
,.

l!
. !
! I
~_j

1

I

Okay.

So we were almost running as we were pushing

And as I was emptying it, then it tipped

20

Q

Which knee? ·

21

A

This one, the right one.

22

in my knee .

23

Q

Tell me what happened then.

24

A

Okay.

25

The handles caught

So my knee was caught between the two

handles--handles, and I felt my knee popping and

·I

I
i

14

1

twisting to the side.

2

here--this area right here was swelling.
THE COURT:

3

He has pointed to

the inside of his right knee is being an area that was

5

swelling.

7

"' l

You can--okay.

4

THE WITNESS:

6

'. i

And right away this bone right

And it was swollen.

And this

whole area right here--here, underneath it.

8

Q

(By the Court)

Front and back?

9

A

Yes, this part right here--this area right

10

here.

I think~-it popped really hard and some--maybe

11

only nerves got twisted.

12

went in to tell the--the employer about it, but she

13

was not there .

Okay.

So then after that I

.I

So then about ten minutes later she showed up

14

\..-1

15

and I told her that I had injured my knee.

16

asked me if I wanted to go to the clinic and I said,

17

~Yes,

18

me her phone number and--and that's when I went.

19

the doctor whose name is written on that piece of

20

paper was the one who saw me.

21

I

i

I want to go to the clinic."

And she

And she just gave
And

And the doctor--when the doctor saw me, he

22

told me that it was a severe sprain.

And that's when

23

the doctor gave me that paper and he said there were

24

two of them, one for me and one for the employer.

25

then he told me that she was going to be able to read

And

j

15
..,;)

•

I
I

... ..!

I

··!

1

what it said in there and that I was able to do work,

2

but it had to be light duty.

3

me that she had no light-duty work for me and that she

4

--and then she fired me.
And if I would-have had money, I would have

5
• 1

And that's when she told

6

hired an attorney.

I know that when a doctor gives

7

you a paper for light duty and they fire you right

8

away, then--then that is not--that would be bad for

9

them.

i

'

1

.J

.i

She--she didn't follow or respected any of the

I

I

10

suggestions the doctor gave her in that letter.

11

was not what I was saying, it's what the doctor was

12

saying.

13
14

II

Q

Okay.

It

What else would he like me to know

about his case?

.I

15

··1

16

see if they would pay to see a doctor.

17

sent me some forms and the thing--they were requesting

18

a lot of information that had nothing to do with me.

19

They were asking me about my son's name, my wife's

20

name, they were not asking information about me.

J
1I
!

.• ~--1

l1

..

,

21

A

So then we--we went to see the insurance to
The insurance

And they had no right to·request all that

I

I

-1

•••• J

•.. -1

22

information that had nothing to do with me.

I was the

23

one who was injured.

24

the information about my family that they were

25

requesting, they closed my case.

And because I didn't give them

16

.I
•... .I

i

;
./

.. ff

j
1

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

.. ''

2

THE

I

I

3

THE COURT:

tJr I'·'

4

! ··i

5

i'

.i '

I

THE WITNESS:

•

I

~ il
•
:

I
1

l:I
..J

j

,,

And so my wife and I called our

insurances and we were fighting to get this case

7

opened again.

8

called, and it's taken us a year to get--to get around

9

them and so we could see a doctor.

And they gave us a new phone number, we

THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything else on direct

testimony?

12

..I

No, no, you can't talk from back

6

11

;

No.

there.

10

~,

INTERPRETER:

(In Spanish.)

THE

WITNESS:

So it--it's been a year that my

13

knee has been hurting and it hurts even at the present

14

time because no one did anything.

15

insurance, they--because I didn't provide all the

16

information that the insurance requested, they were

17

saying that I wanted to commit fraud, but it's not

18

true .

And so the

.

l

19

And they kept saying that I wanted to commit

!

20

fraud and that they were going to take me to court so

l

21

I could see a judge, or that they were even going to

22

send me to jail.

23

got· hurt.

I
)

~

.l
v.;J

I\

24
25

And why would that be fraud?

THE COURT:
£raud case.

Okay.

I--I

We're not here to try a

Just tell him that.

;"_I

17
• I

.,.)

'

I

-.I

1

THE WITNESS:

2

they were telling me.
THE COURT:

3

4

6

THE COURT:

.

Then Mr. Kesler will ask

Uh-huh.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. KESLER:

11

iI

Okay.

THE WITNESS:

9

:

Yes.

you questions that you are required to answer.

8

.i

~

examined at this time?
THE WITNESS:

10

I'm just telling you what

Are you prepared to be cross-

5

7

Yes,

Mr. Mondragon,

Okay.

Q

just--just a quick

12

question about your TTD claim, your--your time off

13

work.

14

claim was from the date of injury to July 15th, 2012.

15

On July 15th, 2012,

16

work?

The Judge mentioned earlier that it was--your

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

And that was with AT Asphalt; is that

19

Yes,

is that the date you returned to

I got a job at another company.

~

correct?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Okay.

On your--your medical treatment, you

I

•... t

22

saw a Dr. Andrus on May 7th of this year; correct?

: .1

;. I

23

A

Uh-huh,

24

Q

In that report Dr. Andrus makes mention of

25

yes.

some possible injections.

Did you actually receive an
18

I

l

1

injection?

ii

2

A

! •.

3

did--he gave it to me.

4

all, r--I was left the same.

i

C

i i
I•;

~

~

;·

I

;

i

i..i
:· ·•1
I

i

i

ri

11

-L'··1
~
i

same visit?

7

A

Yes, he did it himself there.

8

Q

Okay.
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:

I

i

Yes, it was--it was in the

month that Counsel mentioned.

12

doctor saw me he did the injection.
Q

(By Mr. Kesler)

The same day that the

Going to the date of injury,

14

May 22nd of last year, you mentioned in your testimony

15

that the mechanism of injury, you were emptying the

16

wheelbarrow when it tipped to its side; is that

17

correct?
A

Yes.

It was right before I emptied it, then

19

it just tipped to one side.

20

hit me.

21

~

So that just barely happened?

11

18

l

And did you receive that injection at that

6

13

\[@

it didn't help at

Q

10
'· I

In fact,

5

9

;. Ii

Yes, I did receive one injection, and he

Q

Okay.

And that--that's when it

So it was right before--were you in

22

the process of lifting it up to empty it or were you

23

actually still pushing the wheelbarrow?

24

A

No,

I was pushing it.

I was pushing it.

25

Q

And was--was this incident witnessed?

I

__ j

19

1

A

No one saw me, but there were other people

2

working there.

3

injured.

4

Q

And I just told them that I had been

So no one actually saw the accident; is that

.,

!

5

correct?

6

I
i

A

There was another Mexican,

like me, working

7

there just alongside me, and he did.

8

when I got injured.

He did see it

I
• •i

-I

9

Q

And what is his name?

10

A

I don't know.

11

so I didn't know his name.

12

1

, . Ii

Q

Okay.

Going to exactly how the handles

13

struck your body, you mentioned that the handle, as· it

14

tipped to the side, caught your right knee.

15

direction did the wheelbarrow tip as you were pushing

16

it?

17

i

That was my first day there,

A

Which

It tipped to--to the right side, I was--right

18

before I emptied it.

And the surface was not very

19

smoo_th, so it tipped to the side.

20

is, both of your legs and knees are in the middle of

21

the handles.

And you know how it

I

22

I

.•• 1

You mentioned the surface.

23

relatively flat ground?

24

or going down?

25
1

Q

A

Were you on

Were you on a hill, going up

It was on the flat surface, but there were,

20

1

.l

2

,.

I

I

'·I

Q

four of them.

The wheelbarrow itself--have you used many

3

wheelbarrows in--in your life?

4

wheelbarrows in general?

5

I

like, cement bumps,

A

Are you familiar with

Yes, but it all depends on how--on how heavy

6

the--the wheelbarrow is and what it contains.

7

and also the surface.

8

Q

Okay.

And--

And I'm specifically asking about the

: I

L. .. }

9

;' ':

lw

l -1

10
11

;

I

,. I

I
!

· I

. -I

. I

(jJ) :

!

;- I
,,i.___I_I

Was it a standard-

sized wheelbarrow?
A

It was a large wheelbarrow.

12

some wheelbarrows that are really,

13

you can load more material.

14

'.)

size of the wheelbarrow itself.

Q

And there are

really big, and so

So you mentioned it's large.

You're

15

referring to the actual--the basket or the bucket on

16

the wheelbarrow was deeper than a standard wheel-

17

barrow; is that correct?

18

A

Yeah.

Yeah, that was--there are some of them

19

that are not as deep, but the one that I had that day

20

was really deep and I was able to load more material

21

in it.

22

Q

What about the handles of the wheelbarrow?

23

Can you either estimate or just ~how us with your

24

hands about how far apart handles on this or, you

25

know,· a standard wheelbarrow is?
21

1

.I
.. I
-,

.i

I

.I

Well, you--you should know that.

All the

2

handles for wheelbarrows are about the same distance,

3

they are not (inaudible).

4

used, there's the same distance between handles.

5
6

.i

A

Q

Any wheelbarrow that I have

And that's what I was getting at, is it--it

was a standard-width handle?

7

A

Yes, but if you would like me to,

I can stand

8

up and show you how--how it happened and how my knee

9

was caught in the--

10

Q

Let's--let's proceed with a couple of other

11

questions and--and I may take you up on that offer.

12

So describe to me as--or you described in

.l
.l

13

your testimony that as it was tipping, the handle

14

caught your right knee and that your knee was caught

15

between the two handles; is that correct?

:]

16

J

17
18

A

Yes.

I would like to show you better how it

went.
THE COURT:

19

now, as best you can.

20

THE WITNESS:

21

MR. KESLER:

You just answer the question for

·1

22

Yes.
If you don't mind, Your Honor,

I--I wouldn't mind having him stand--

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. KESLER:

25

THE CO0RT:

Okay.

I--

--and just point-Could you go down in front and
22

1

show us, then?

''

! ,•

r·.

3

{By Mr. Kesler)

Q

2

Okay.

Let--while you're

just let me ask you a question.

here,

I '.

($I.!

5

right, can you describe where the handle that would

6

have been in your right hand would have hit you on

7

your leg?

8

A

I--I just want to show you how it happened.

9

Q

I'm going to need you to just answer my

10

.I
i

So as the wheelbarrow is tipping to the

4

;

11

questions at this point.
A

Uh-huh.

I was holding the wheelbarrow like

12

this and (inaudible) this.

One handle was--one handle

13

was on this side and the other handle was on that

14

side, and this leg was back.

I

:d

'..J
\;;JP!

I

i l
t:J

I]

15
16

~

I

Can you, with your hand, just point to the

18

location of the place where the right handle would

19

have struck your leg as it was falling?

21

A

22

One handle was here and the other one was

here.

.J

u

Okay, let--let me be a little more clear with

my question.

17

20
!

Q

Q

Okay.

But specifically the right handle,

23

which would have been the outside handle, can you show

24

me where that would have struck your·leg?

25

A

The right handle hit me here and the other
23

I

- •• J

1

one hit me here.

2

Q

handle would have hit you above your right knee on the

4

outside of your right leg?

6

A

;

I
'

Q

Okay.

And I missed that.

So the other

handle--the left handle, point to where that--that

9

struck you.

10
11
12

A

One hit me here, the other one hit me up

here.
Q

Okay.

So the left handle, were you pointing

13

just maybe three or four inches below your right knee

14

on the inside of your leg?

15

~i

And the other one hit me

8

,
~

Yes, yes, here.

here.

7
~

So are you--are you saying the right

3

5

.I

Okay.

A

Uh-huh, yes.

So when both handles--when my

16

knee was between both handles, my bone popped, and I

17

think that's when this bone right here did something

18

weird.

19

Q

20

Okay.

You can return to the stand now.

MR. KESLER:

Your Honor, we ran--we ran into

21

this problem at the deposition, just having a--I don't

22

know if you're having the same problem visualizing

23

what--

..j

. I

~J

.. 24
25

THE COURT:
MR. KESLER:

Not at all .
Okay.
24

THE COURT:

1
2
:'· ii
<,j) .!

I've had a wheelbarrow tip on me.

3

MR. KESLER:

4

THE COURT:

5

!

Okay.
It's not at all difficult to

understand.
MR. KESLER:

6

: .\!

I can see how this could happen.

If--if Your Honor will indulge

7

me,

I actually brought along, just for demonstrative

8

purposes, a wheelbarrow.

9

it in and have him demonstrate how this would have

Would you allow me to bring

l

10

'·I

I

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. KESLER:

Absolutely.
Okay.

Can we just take a brief

13

two-minute recess and I'll run out and--and grab it

14

from my vehicle?

15
16

;!

happened?

THE COURT:

Oh, it's out--let's take a five-

minute recess.

17

THE WITNESS:

Uh-huh.

18

(A recess was taken.)

19

THE COURT:

We're back on the record in the

20

Mondragon matter.

21

examining the witness.

22

And, Counsel, you're cross-

MR. KESLER:

Right.

Okay.

I'm not sure

I

i
.:.I

~

.!

23

exactly how you want to do this, Your Honor.

24

just want to have him come down and--

25

THE COURT:

If you

You get to ask your--the

25

1

questions and--

2

Q

(By Mr. Kesler)

Mr. Mondragon, if you could

3

please come down.

I've located a wheelbarrow here in

4

front of--of counsel's table .

5

THE COURT:

.. ,

i

6

is that a similar-size wheelbarrow?

7

THE WITNESS:

8

THE COURT:
Q

9

10

Let me ask first, Mr. Mondragon,

Yes, it's about the same, yeah.
Okay.

(By Mr. Kesler)

Thank you.
Okay.

Mr. Mondragon, if you

could demonstrate.

11

A

So I--when I hit (inaudible) and was walking

12

and the wheelbarrow was full, and (inaudible) when

13

this handle right here hit me here·and knocked me

14

down.

15

Q

Okay.

Go ahead and tip that up like you
r,,

16

~

were.

17

'·I.i
,. ~. l

THE COURT:

18

Q

19

there.

20

up.

Don't get hurt, though.

(By Mr. Kesler)

Now, if you will stop right

Back--back up as it's tipping over.

21

A

Like this?

22

Q

Yeah.

Lift it

And could you note where the right

i
i

~

23
24

25

handle is striking your leg?
A

It knocked me down and this handle right here

was the one who hit me right here.
26

1

2

\. ·!

Q

Okay.

And then could you--sorry.

Could you

tip it back up like you were, again?

3

A

Like this.

4

Q

Okay.

And now stop right there.

Can you

5

note--no, I neect-~I need you to stay there.

Could you

6

note where--could you note where the left handle--

7

about what height on your body that handle is located?

8

A

Right here.

9

Q

Would it be correct that that left handle is

!.. !

! l

10

about chest height, when--as the wheelbarrow was

11

tipping over?

12

0P

f-l
:. l

!

r

'IJfU

A

Well, I don't know how--! don't know how it

13

caught me, but the thing is that it got caught

14

(inaudible) and the wheelbarrow tipped over to the

15

side and--and this handle right here was the one that

16

hit me right here--

17

Q

Okay.

Could you--

18

A

--and that's when I felt my knee kind of

popping towards the outside--

I

19

I

20

Q

Could you just take--

21

A

--inside.

22

Q

--that wheelbarrow all the way over onto its

I

~.. .J

23

side and just let it rest there?

; I

24

(inaudible}.

25

please.

i;_j[

No, without

Just--just tip it over to the side,

Thank you.
27

1

I

Okay.

Could you step up to the wheelbarrow?

2

A

What it did--

3

Q

Oh, no, wait,

just--just stand there.

4

next to the handles, please.

Is it correct that that

5

upper handle, which is the left handle, is about waist

6

height?

.I

7

A

No (inaudible}.

l.I

8

Q

Just below your waist?

9

A

Uh-huh.

10

Q

Okay.

11

wheelbarrow.

12
13

.I

-I

Stand

14

I think--! think that's all for the
You can return to the stand.

Thank you.

Mr. Mondragon, how tall are you?
A

I think I'm about five--five feet tall,

something like that.

1

15

Q

Five feet?

.I

16

A

Five, and maybe a little more, but I'm not

I

i

~

17

.J

18

MR. KESLER:

19

THE COURT:

20
..

I

sure .

21

I think that's all I've got.
Okay.

Do you have anything to

add to your testimony?
MR. MONDRAGON:

I

(inaudible).

I just want

~

J
!

,;

:.J

22

to know if the company is going to pay me.

And I

23

don't know if you noticed in the doctors' reports that

24

.maybe they want to put me through some type of

25

something--! don't know what it's called--to see if I
28

1

have any--if my knee is fractured or something is

2

wrong with it .

.

:•

r: .:

.!

THE COURT:

3

Okay.

Tell him thank you very

f,
~: !

4

much for his testimony, and you can return back to the

5

table.

......

i
l.. I

Mr. Kesler, did you have any objection to

6

r··,

t\

7

P-1?

I don't know if you found it already in the

8

medical--

Ll

MR. KESLER:

9

10

records exhibit.

11

give me just a moment.

12

And is that dated the date of injury?

14

I

iJ

j·

·1

t_.

f

l

!

I

:.1

I can give you the page, if you'll

THE COURT:

13

I

It actually is in the medical

minute.

I had it found at one point.

Yes,

five twenty--no, wait a

Yes, 5/22/2012.
May I approach?

15

MR. KESLER:

16

think that's the same; right?

17

THE COURT:

It is.

18

MR. KESLER:

Okay.

19

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Just verify--I

So--it's duplicative,

20

so, Mr. Mondragon--I'rn going to have to that take

21

back.
MR. KESLER:

22

Okay.

Would you like me to show

;_.]

23

. :I

24

THE COURT: . What page. number is that?

25

MR. KESLER:

him?

'. j

...

' I
:...

It's MRI 29.

29
i

...,>"

...1

1

.i

I

THE COURT:

Mr. Mondragon, that is already

2

part of the record, so you can keep your paper.

3

have it as part of the official record.

And I

4

Do you have any other witnesses or evidence?

5

MR. MONDRAGON:

Na,

just that--I just want to

6

know if the doctor's (inaudible)--the doctor's still

7

going to see me,

8

it, because I need to--to get better.

9

healed.

if the insurance is going to pay for
I need to be

__I

10
11
.

THE COURT:

Okay.

This is not the time for

argument of the case, if he has no further evidence.

:
I

12

MR. MONDRAGON:

13

THE COURT:

14

Uh-huh.

Do you have any witnesses or

evidence that you intend to present, Mr. Kesler?

15

MR. KESLER:

I
.. I

16

THE COURT:

17

your chance to make your legal argument as to why your

.I

18

claim should be allowed.

I

19

Not from us.
Both sides have rested.

This is

I will tell you, Mr. Mondragon, a lot of this

20

case has to do with what the doctors are saying,

21

because I have doctors saying that your knee was not

22

hurt at work, but was already hurt from other

J

23

injuries, and I have a doctor saying that it was work.

!.

24

I am not a doctor, so you'll probably be sent to

25

another doctor--a panel of Labor Commission doctors.

!

•. i

30

MR. MONDRAGON:

2

THE COURT:

3

.,
<@

1

Can I explain something?

Oh, he can make a closing

argument, yes .

i

!

j

.

'

\
i

I

4

MR. MONDRAGON:

I explained that to the

5

doctor, that the accidents that I had--that I had

6

before, they sent me to see doctors for those

7

accidents and to do therapy, and my knee was fine

8

after that.

'. j

THE COURT:

9
~

Yes, that 1 s in the medical

!

I

i

iI

10

record.

I

11

that--that this is the same thing.

But still, some doctors are not convinced

.i

12

MR. MONDRAGON:

This is a different thing.

13

This· is what happened to me when I got injured at--at

14

that job, and the other ones don't have anything to do

15

with it.

16

really good insurance, and so they--they make sure

17

that my knee was fine.

18

insurance, in particular, is trying to look for any

; i

19

excuses to not approve the case.

I

20
21

•

Where I worked before, they had really,

THE COURT:

And I just noticed that this

Okay.

We'll let me Mr. Kesler

make his closing argument.

22

MR. KESLER:

23

As I mentioned in opening, there have been

Thank you, Your Honor.

I

. i

l

~

.i
,_·.1

24 - numerous problems with this claim from the beginning .
25

It was initially denied due to Petitioner's refusal to

31

1

cooperate.

2

delays, motions to compel, continuances due to

3

discovery issues.

4

More than that, the description of the

5

accident that Petitioner alleges--he testified that

6

the handle struck him--the right handle, as the

7

wheelbarrow was tipping to the right, struck him three

8

to four inches above his right knee, on the outside of

9

his leg.

He testified that the left handle--testified

10

that the left handle struck him three to four inches

11

below the knee, on the inside of his right leg, as the

·12

wheelbarrow was tipping to the right.
On our demonstrative exhibit here, Petitioner

13

.. II

There have been, as Your Honor is aware,

14

showed that as the wheelbarrow was tipping, while the

15

right handle could strike the outside of his right leg

16

at some point, the left handle was at chest height.

17

Your Honor, Petitioner states he's around five feet

18

tall.

19

with this wheelbarrow, trying to recreate the injury

20

that Petitioner describes and--and I could not do it.

I

··1

!
1

f

• J

..J

l

21

I'm six foot.

I spent 20 minutes last night

The--the handles--the way that he--he

22

explains they trapped his leg, they were not--they

23

will not fit between my legs.

24

Peti t.ioner was standing., the upper handle, as--

25

wherever it was tipped was at--at or just below his

And, as you noticed, as

-~
32

J

~-

1

waist level.

2

could have simultaneously been on the inside of his

3

leg and the outside of his leg at a distance of little

4

more than a foot apart when, as you can see,

5

wheelbarrow handles are at least double that distance

6

in width.

7

wheelbarrow falls.

8
9
10

.i

• I

1.1

. I

what we've seen here today, it just makes no logical
sense that this--

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. KESLER:

13

LUIS MONDRAGON:

14

THE COURT:

15

LUIS MONDRAGON:

16

THE COURT:

17

LUIS MONDRAGON:

18

20

I

You can't help.
--that this incident-Can't I talk--

No.
--or {inaudible)?

You can't talk.
I'm a witness, so I want to

say something .
THE COURT:

No, you're not a witness.

haven't been called in this hearing.
MR. KESLER:

21

;.. ]

And those handles don't change as--as the

It's--based on Petitioner's testimony and

19

I

There's no physical way that that handle

You

Thank you.

It makes no sense that the

22

incident could have occurred, at least the way that he

23

described it.

24

witness.

25

discovery, in deposition.

Petitioner alleges that there was a

He was questioned about this earlier in
He· can't produce this
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1
2

notes, "It's clear that the patient has quite an

4

extensive history of prior knee pain."

5

contend that this incident that was unwitnessed, or

6

that Petitioner cannot produce corroborating

7

testimony, did not occur.

9
.1

i!

J

]

.1

Petitioner--it's clear that he had
preexisting knee problems.

This was his first day on

the job and it's--the facts just stack up in such a

11

way that Respondents cannot reach a point where we can

12

see how this incident occurred.
Additionally, the initial medical report we

14

reference in here at MR29,

15

not MR at 29, it's MR30--it shows there was no

16

bruising on Petitioner's leg.

17

mentioned that his leg had--had swollen in multiple

18

locations on his leg.

19

: .J

Respondents

10

13

.•

It's clear--Dr. Fotheringham, in his report,

3

8

'!

person.

it shows--or I apologize,

There was--Petitioner

He mentioned that--on the inside of his right

20

knee, on the front and the back were swollen.

21

report mentions there may have been--I apologize--

22

there may have been slight swelling above the joint

23

line medally--medially, but there was no additional

24
25

The

.swelling, no bruising, none of the telltale signs
that--that an incident of this nature, a wheelbarrow
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1

full of gravel tipping over and striking your leg had

2

actually occurred.

3

1.1

!

i

I i

Your Honor, it--Respondents submit that

4

Petitioner has not and cannot satisfy his burden of

5

showing that this accident occurred and submit that,

6

therefore, his case should be dismissed.

7

the event that Your Honor finds that the accident did

8

occur, based on Dr. Fotheringham's report, this is

9

going to have to go to a medical panel to address

However, in

I

~ Ll

10

causation, treatment, as well as causation of his--his

!_

!

11

current symptoms.

;-

i

!I

12

We--we settled the wage issue earlier, so

13

that--that has been resolved.

14

that, notwithstanding the implausible nature of the

.i

15

accident, Your Honor finds that this occurred, then--

! I

16

then this case will clearly have to go to a medical

17

panel.

i ,~

V

1'

L.:.;

i;-. ·1i
c.. J

18

I

I

,••.•J

lI I;
1..J

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Mondragon, as I

indicated, you get the last word because you--it's

20

your case, so you can--

!

!! I

And with that, we submit it.

19

MR. MONDRAGON:

.l
I

So in the--in the event

The person that saw it, I

22

don't know his name, but I know where he lives, so I

23

can take him there (inaudible)--

2.4

25·

THE COURT:
trial, so ...

No, .. today's the date and time for

So, but he can-35

I

..J

1

J

when the wheelbarrow tipped over, is the one that hit

3

me really hard right here above the knee.
THE COURT:

All right.

I wish I could tell

5

you that these cases could be resolved quickly, but

6

especially where there are doctors saying two

7

different things, they take some time.

8

decision in writing that will tell you what the

9

decision is, and it may require that you cooperate and

10
11
12
13
14

15

I

The handle--the right handle,

2

4

I

MR. MONDRAGON:

16

You will get a

go to a Labor Commission medical panel.
With that being said, the evidentiary record
will be closed and we're adjourned.
MR. MONDRAGON:

So when you said "in

writing"--so (inaudible)-THE COURT:
apparently.

We're back on the record,

We're sort of adjourned.

I

... ,)

·1

.i

17
18

I

So the decision would be sent

in writing; is that what you are saying?

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. MONDRAGON:

21

bills that I'm getting?

22
.:.J

MR. MONDRAGON:

THE COURT:

Yes.
So what about the medical
Can they pay for that?

At this point they're being

23

denied and that would be (inaudible).

24

correct, Mr. Kesler?

25

MR. KESLER:

Is that

;.. t

Correct.
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1

MR. MONDRAGON:

! ! -.i

2

They--they committed to pay them.

r .!

3

~

'

;

THE COURT:

But why are they denied?

The whole reason that we're here

;

i.i

4

is because they, number one, don't believe the

5

accident happened.

6

that says his knee was already injured and it isn't

7

due to the accident.

And number two, they have a doctor

8

MR. MONDRAGON:

9

THE COURT:

Which--which doctor is that?

Dr. Fotheringham.

And that's why

•. I

~, I

.!

! .i

10

I have to send it to my own doctors .

11

All right.

12

MR. MONDRAGON:

13

to the doctor on my own.
THE COURT:

14

15
16
17
18

,.
!

The case is over at this point.

right.

It's not that I wanted to go
They sent me to see--

Right.

Absolutely, that's their

They get to do that.
MR. KESLER:

I'm sorry, Your Honor.

Are we

adjourned?
THE COURT:

Well, we have been adjourned.

19

And, you know, this is not the time--the--the case is

20

over, there--we're here because you disagree.

21

have your side, they have theirs.

22

decision in writing, and the case is closed.

23

You

I will issue a

(The hearing was concluded.)

24

* * *

25

* * *
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C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
I, Ann M. Love, a Registered Professional
Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of
Utah, do hereby certify:
That the foregoing tape-recorded proceedings were
transcribed into typewriting under my direction and
.1

supervision and that the foregoing pages contain a
true and correct transcription of said proceedings to

I

.l
. ·'

the best of my ability to do so.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my
name and seal this 21st day of September 2014 .

·_j
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!
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.

i

;

ANN M. LOVE, RPR
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DMSION
Southern Utah Adjudication Office
1173 South 250 West
Bldg. 1 Ste. 304
Saint George UT 84770
(435) 634-5580

ALBERTO MONDRAGON,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER

vs.

Case No. 12-0664

]P'S LANDSCAPING and/ or OWNERS
INSURANCE CO,
Respondent.

Judge Cheryl D Luke

HEARING:

2nd Floor Courtroom, Labor Commission, 68 S 100.E, PO Box 1840,
Parowan UT 84761, on June 12, 2013 at 9:00AM. Said Hearing was
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Chetyl D Luke, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Petitioner, Alberto Mondragon, was present and represented himself.
The Respondents, JP's Landscaping and Owners Insurance Co, were
represented by attorney Cody Kessler.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Petitioner, Alberto Mondragon, filed an Application for Hearing with the Adjudication Division
of the Utah Labor Commission C'Court") on August 17, 2012, and claimed entitlement to the
following workers' compensation benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care,
and; (3) temporaty total disability compensation. Mr. Mondragon's claim for workers' compensation
benefits arose out of an industrial accident that occurred on 5/22/2012.
The Respondents denied that there was an industrial accident on 5/22/2012 or that the accident
medically caused Alberto Mondtagon's injuries. The Respondents argued that Alberto Mondragon
suffered preexisting or independent medical problems that caused any disability endured by Alberto
Mondragon.

-~

Respondents argued that Mr. Mondragon's medical history demonstrated that his current knee
problems are part of his histoty of degenerative and arthritic knee conditions and not medically
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causally .related to the industrial accident. They did not argue legal causation .in the matter and no
medical opinion exists regarding contribution and therefore legal causation is not at issue.
The Court held an evidentiary hearing on June 12, 2013, and issued an Interim Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on November 5, 2013. On November 14, 2013, the Court refetted
the medical issues to a medical panel, which filed its report on May 8, 2014. The Court then mailed
the Medical Panel Report to the parties on May 14, 2014, and g-ranted the parties 20 days to file any
objections to the admissibility of the report. On May 21, 2014, Respondents filed an objection to the
Report, arguing that the matter should have been dismissed after the hearing axguing that the
Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof that an accident occurred. Respondent also argued the
medical panel report should not be admitted into the record because the panel relied on facts that
are not consistent with the Interim Order and Findings of Fact.
Respondent's argument that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of p.toof that an accident
occurred fails to understand the Court's previous ruling based on the evidence presented at the
hearing. The Court found Mr. Mondragon's testimony regarding his work day to be believable and
truthful. Mr. Mondragon had without a doubt been working for Respondent employer hauling a
wheel barrow full of g-ravel at the time of the injury. He was working fast, almost running, with a
large conttactot wheel barrow when he lost control of the load and it tipped. At that point Mr.
Mondragon's accident description is flawed in the details. Mr. Mondragon has always felt he was hit
in the knee while being caught between the wheel barrow handles. Respondents brought a wheel
banow to court and asked M.r. Mondragon to demonstrate the physical aspects of the accident.
Given M.t. Mondragon's height and the size of a similar wheel battow it did not seem likely that the
handle hit Mr. Mondragon's knee as previously stated. What remained quite dear was that Mr.
Mondragon did use his legs and body to tty and keep control of the wheel barrow and when the
heavy load tipped he and the wheel barrow where jerked and tousled. It is common experience to
know how quickly a heavy wheel barrow can become out of control as it is the nature of the one
wheeled device.
It is one thing for Respondent's to show that the exact mechanism of injury as previously stated was
not correct but their argument failed when they went so far as to argue that no accident at all took
place. This Court finds it easy to believe that people can be hurt and that they may be confused
about the "mechanism of injury" which is important only in this legal setting and not a concern of
most accident victims. If Mr. Mondragon has a flawed recollection of the details of the injury or
even if a victim had little or no recollection of accident details the case can be made that an accident
took place from the facts known before and aftet the moment of injury. In this case we know the
nature of the_ heavy work being done, the pace of the work, the loss of control over the wheel
barrow and the resultant pain and injury. The evidence proved that an industrial accident of
substantial exertion took place.
The Court sent the matter to the medical panel with an accurate factual description of the known
events and also told them the exact mechanism of injury was not known. The panel did not engage
in fact finding or act in a manner that was repugnant to the Coutts Findings of Fact. Here
Respondent again inflates his argument and evidence. On page five of Respondent's objection they
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note that the Court failed to inform the medical panel that a "twisting type injuty" was disproved at
trial and goes on to say that the Court only told the panel that the evidence showed that the handle
of the wheel barrow did not «rut'• Mr. Mondragon's right knee. That is because the demonstration
as seen and evaluated by the Court showed that the handle of the wheel barrow did not "hit'' Mr.
Moncb:agon's knee in the demonstration that detail was disproved The demonstration did convince
the Court that Mr. Mondragon had the accident with the tipping wheel barrow and he did injure his
knee at that time.
The medical panel uses the word twisting type injw:y and then they go on to explain and support
their opinion by noting that «the prolonged nature of the medial joint line pain and swelling the
findings on physical examination of medial pain, +McMurray's, and a Baker,s cyst all suggest injw:y
of the meniscus." The panel used their medical expertise and the medical evidence before them to
form a medical causal opinion regarding the work accident and a meniscal injury.
The Court has the responsibility of detenn.ining the factual evidence in this case. The medical panel
had the responsibility to perform their examination which includes taicing a medical history. In this
case the information they were given regarding "twisting" is completely consistent with the in court
demonstration done with the wheel barrow and is not repugnant in any way to the evidence
presented in this matter.
Under Utah Code Section 34A-2-601 allow parties an opportunity to object to medical panel
reports. If no objection is filed the report is entered into the record and at that point, the
preponderance of all evidence, including medical evidence, must be considered in reaching a final
determination in the matter.

In this case the objection filed goes to the weight the report should be given rather than its
admission into the record. The Court finds no new or compelling evidence that is a basis for
holding a hearing oµ the report or for excluding the report from the record The medical panel
report is admitted into the record pursuant to Utah Code Section 34A-2-601.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT
A.

Employment.

The Respondent JP's Landscaping, insured by Owners Insurance Co, employed Alberto Mondragon
on 5/22/2012.

B.

Compensation Rate. (Not in dispute)

At the ti.me of the accident in issue, Alberto Mondragon eamed $12. per hour and worked a 40 hour
workweek.

C.

Light Duty Work
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There was no light duty work available. lvfr. Mondragon was terminated from employment with
Respondent after the accident. Mr. Mondragon went back to work on July 15, 2012 with ADT
asphalt and works in a heavy exertion job.

D.

Industrial Accident and Injwy.

The exact mechanism of injury is unclear. Mr. Mondragon was working with a wheel barrow full of
gravel at the time of the injury. He was working fast, ahnost running, with a large contractor wheel
barrow when he lost control of the load and it tipped. Mr. Mondragon believed that one of the
handles of the wheel barrow hit his right knee. An in court demonstration proved that the accident
could not have occurred as described. It is clear that Mr. Mondragon felt a pop in the knee.
He was seen at Work-med on the day of the accident about three hours post accident. At that time
the doctor noted that the right knee appeared normal in appearance. There was no visible bruising.
There may have been slight swelling above the joint line medially. There was no patellar swelling or
tenderness. He was diagnosed with a right knee sprain. He was given medication and released to
light duty and was to be referred to ao orthopedic specialist for further evaluation. [IvfRE page 31
and 32]

E.

Medical Opinions

The Plaintiff had two prior work related knee injuries, both of which diagnosed contusions and were
reportedly resolved. Dr. Andrus at Zion's orthopedic clinic noted that 2006 radiograpbs showed
some mild degenerative joint disease.
Dr. Bart Fotheringham performed an independent medical examination in this matter. He opines
that the Petitioner had an extensive history of prior knee pain. He opines the accident at issue may
have aggravated preexisting degenerative changes. He states he does not believe it is within
reasonable medical probability his current symptoms are the direct .result of the accident at issue.
He finds the return of the Petitioner to heavy work by July 15, 2012 shows that the injury from this
accident ended. He then feels other factors or injury after that date would be responsible for current
complaints.
Treating physicians are recommending treatment and indicate the accident is industrial.
Recommendation for future treatment involves further diagnostic scans and then treatment as
indicated Dr. Fotheringham does not think that further treatment is necessary as a result of the
accident at issue.
Dr. Scott Smith, an orthopaedic surgeon, served as medical panel chair in this matter. Dr. Ross
McNaught, an orthopedic specialist, served as a panel member. The medical panel had the Interim
Order and Findings of Fact entered after the hearing in the matter; the medical records; diagnostics;
and, they had the opportunity to examine the Petitioner.

00120

Findings of Fact, Conclusion:. of Law and Order
Alberto Mondragon vs. JP's Landscaping and/ or Owners Insurance Co
Case No. 12-0664
Page 5

The panel opined that there is a causal connection between the accident in 2012 and the petitioner's
ongoing knee problems. They noted that although the Petitioner has suffered previous medical
conditions to the knee they were contusions and not similar to the present injury. They explain, "He
was doing heavy labor prior to the industrial mishap without symptoms. His accident occurred. His
symptoms began at the time of his injury and have been unabated since."
The Panel specifically disagrees with Dr. Fotheringham. They note that Dr. Fotheringham opines
that the 2012 accident aggravated pre-existing degenerative changes. The panel notes that it is
unlikely that arthritis (degenerative change) is the cause of Mr. Mondragon's problems because
radiographs show healthy joint weight bearing surfaces, with minimal arthritic changes consistent
with age and heavy use.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 34A-2-418 (1) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act requires employers and insurance
companies to pay "reasonable swns for [medical care] necessary to tteat" a work injury.
We do know that Mr. Mondragon was well with no knee impairment and capable of heavy work
prior to the accident. We know what he was doing at the time of the accident and that was wheeling
a very heavy large wheelbarrow at a fast pace when he unexpectedly lost control of the load. At that
time he felt a "pop" in his knee and from that point suffered the pain and injury consistent with a
finding of meniscal tear.
Mr. Mondragon does not accurately describe the exact details of the accident Preswnably he was
trying to recover the load and focused on his work. Demanding more precision about the exact
mechanism of injury is inconsistent with the spirit of the workers' compensation law which is to be
liberally construed to accomplish its purpose of assisting injured workers and avoiding the costs
associated with traditional civil liability and litigation.

The panel analyzed the medical history in this case and it is clear from the date of injury to the
present Mr. Mondragon's knee problem is consistent with a meniscal injury suffexed at the time of
accident.
The panel opines that Mr. Mondragon's necessary medical care to treat injury from the industrial
accident has been his past care and in the future a right knee arthroscopy, physical therapy postsurgery, and post operative medications. The panel does not find that cortisone injections a.re
necessary at this time.

[Intentionally left blank]

'.

·..:-·
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ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED JP's Landscaping and/ or Owners Insurance Co shall pay past
and future medical bills related to the necessary care ofIYfr. Mondragon's right knee injury consistent
with the medical panel's opinion including an arthroscopic meniscectomy and post surgical care.

DATEDthis_0-=--_day·of

~t

• 2014.

Administrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication Division of
the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific basis for review
and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this decision is signed.
Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days of the date
of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its response.
If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Boll.rd, the review wilbbe conducted
by the Utah Labor Commissioner.
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order, was mailed on September 3, 2014, to the persons/parties at the following addtesses:

Alberto Mondngon
465 S 100 E
Ivins UT 84738
Owners Insurance Co
olson.jake@aoins.com
JP's Landscaping
c/ o mark-sumsion@rbmn.com
Mark R Sumsion Esq
mark-swnsion@rbmn.com

Clerk
Adjudication Division
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APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ALBERTO MONDRAGON,
Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER AFFIRMING
ALJ'S DECISION

JP'S LANDSCAPING and OWNERS
INSURANCE CO.,

Case No. 12-0664

Respondents.

JP's Landscaping and its insurance carrier, Owners Insurance Co., (collectively referred to as
"JP") ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge
Luke's award of benefits to Alberto Mondragon under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Title
34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated.
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to §630-4-3 0 I
of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and §34A-2-801(4) of the Utah Workers' Compensation
Act.

BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
Mr. Mondragon claims workers' compensation benefits for a right-knee injury he attributes to
an accident on May 22, 2012, while he was working for JP. In his application for hearing, Mr.
Mondragon asserts that he was pushing a full wheelbarrow when it tipped over and "caught" his right
knee. He later described that his right knee was caught and twisted between the handles of the
wheelbarrow as it tipped over.
Judge Luke held an evidentiary hearing, during which Mr. Mondragon was asked to
demonstrate how the injury occurred with a wheelbarrow similar to the one he was using at the time
of the accident. The demonstration showed that the wheelbarrow handles could not have caught and
twisted Mr. Mondragon's right knee as he alleged because they were too far apart. Judge Luke
nevertheless concluded it was "clear Mr. Mondragon felt a pop" in his right knee as a result of the
accident while working for JP.

·)

.-

Judge Luke determined that the medical aspects of the claim should be referred to an
impartial medical panel. The medical panel described Mr. Mondragon's injury as a twisting injury.
The panel concluded that Mr. Mondragon's right-knee problems were medically caused by the work
accident and recommended arthroscopic evaluation. Judge Luke relied on the medical panel's
opinion over JP's objection and awarded Mr. Mondragon the cost of medical treatment and future
medical care outlined by the panel.
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JP requested review of Judge Luke's decision by arguing that the award of benefits was error
because the work accident could not have occurred as described by Mr. Mondragon. The
Commission determined that although Mr. Mondragon was probably mistaken about the exact
mechanism of injury, there was sufficient evidence to show that he sustained a right-knee injury
while working for JP. The Commission remanded the matter to Judge Luke for clarification of the
medical panel's findings in light of the fact that the mechanism of injury was uncertain.
On remand, the medical panel clarified its reasoning and ultimately reiterated its opinion that
Mr. Mondragon's right-knee injury was medically caused by his employment with JP. Judge Luke
relied on the medical panel's clarified report and awarded Mr. Mondragon benefits, including the
treatment recommended by the medical panel. JP now seeks review of Judge Luke's order on
remand by the Appeals Board. JP renews its argument that Mr. Mondragon's claim should have
been dismissed without referral to the medical panel because he did not show that the accident
actually occurred. JP also reiterates that Judge Luke impermissibly raised a theory of the accident
that Mr. Mondragon did not allege. Lastly, JP contends that even if another theory ofthe accident is
allowed, the matter must be remanded so that JP can properly argue its defense that Mr. Mondragon
has not met the more stringent standard of legal causation outlined in Allen v. Industrial Comm 'n,
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Appeals Board adopts and summarizes the Commission's previous findings of fact in
this matter and finds additional facts from the record to be material to JP' s motion for review. Mr.
Mondragon has a history of bilateral knee pain. On May 22, 2012, Mr. Mondragon began working
for JP as part of its landscaping business. On that day, Mr. Mondragon asserts that he was working
very quickly carrying a full wheelbarrow when it fell over and injured his right knee. During the
evidentiary hearing, Mr. Mondragon described that he felt his right knee pop. He explained that his
right knee became caught between the wheelbarrow handles when the left handle struck the inside of
his right leg a few inches below the knee and the right handle struck him above the knee. At the
hearing, Mr. Mondragon was unable to replicate the mechanism of injury because the wheelbarrow
handles were too far apart to twist his knee between them.

Mr. Mondragon testified that he experienced severe swelling in his right knee due to the
accident. He describes that he reported the accident and was sent to WorkMed for evaluation. Dr.
Britt at WorkMed recounts Mr. Mondragon's description of the accident as slipping when a full
wheelbarrow tilted and feeling a sudden Hpop" and pain in his right knee but no impact to the knee.
Dr. Britt examined Mr. Mondragon and noted that there ''may be slight swelling" in his right knee,
but that it appeared normal with no visible bruising. Dr. Britt assessed Mr. Mondragon with a rightknee sprain and released him to light-duty work. JP did not have light-duty work available and
terminated Mr. Mondragon's employment. He returned to work on July 15, 2012, with another
employer.
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On May 7, 2013, nearly a year after the accident, Mr. Mondragon sought treatment from Dr.
Andruss for pain in his right knee. Mr. Mondragon told Dr. Andruss that the injury occurred when a
full wheelbarrow fell on its side and "trapped" his right knee, which Dr. Andruss described as a
"rotation-type" injury. Dr. Andruss noted that radiographs showed moderate arthritic changes to
both of Mr. Mondragon's knees, with some mild patellofemoral arthritis in his right knee. Dr.
Andruss concluded that Mr. Mondragon's current condition was likely medically caused by the 2012
work accident. Dr. Andruss based his diagnosis on Mr. Mondragon's description of the mechanism
of injury and his subjective complaints, as well as the examination findings.
A few weeks later, JP's medical consultant, Dr. Fotheringham, evaluated Mr. Mondragon's
right-knee condition. Dr. Fotheringham opined that Mr. Mondragon's current right-knee problems
were not medically caused by the work accident. Dr. Fotheringham opined that the work accident
may have aggravated the underlying degenerative changes in Mr. Mondragon 's right knee, but only
temporarily. Dr. Fotheringham referred to treatment notes by Adon Pearson, PA-C, on August 31,
2012, in which Mr. Mondragon was noted to have experienced knee pain for a month. Dr.
Fotheringham reasoned that the treatment notes from Mr. Pearson suggest Mr. Mondragon re-injured
his right knee after he returned to work for a different employer in July 2012. However, such
treatment notes could not be located in the medical record. Dr. Fotheringham concluded it was not
medically probable that Mr. Mondragon required future medical care as a result of the accident, but
found that the treatment from WorkMed was appropriate.
· Judge Luke referred the medical aspects of this matter to an impartial medical panel
consisting of Dr. Smith, an orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. McNaught, an orthopedic expert. The
medical panel reviewed Mr. Mondragon' s relevant medical history and examined him. As described
above, the panel was instructed to clarify its opinion based on an uncertain mechanism of injury
rather than the one that the panel surmised in its first report. In its clarified report, the medical panel
acknowledged that the exact mechanism of injury was unclear, but that the evidence showed Mr.
Mondragon was carrying a full wheelbarrow very quickly when he lost control of it and the
wheelbarrow tipped over. The panel explained that the amount and type of stress on Mr.
Mondragon's knee while trying to hold a full wheelbarrow and keep it from tipping over is
significant and could cause a meniscal tear. The panel added that individuals who suffer a tom
meniscus often describe the sensation of being hit in the knee like Mr. Mondragon did.
The medical panel noted that the right-knee symptoms Mr. Mondragon reported, such as
prolonged medial joint line pain, swelling, a positive McMurray's test, and a Baker's cyst all
suggested an acute injury to the meniscus and he had not experienced such symptoms with his
previous knee problems. The panel explained that Mr. Mondragon's right-knee inju1y was different
from his previous knee problems because they did not involve the joint. The panel ultimately
confirmed its original finding that Mr. Mondragon's right-knee symptoms were likely due to a
meniscal injury that occurred during the work accident. The panel recommended an arthroscopic
evaluation, along with doctor's visits and medication, as treatment for Mr. Mondragon's work injury.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides benefits to workers injured by accident
"arising out of and in the course of' employment. Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-40 l. To qualify for
benefits under the foregoing standard, an injured worker must establish that his or her work was both
the legal cause and the medical cause of the injury in question. See Allen, supra. Implicit in this
standard is the injured worker's burden to show that an accident actually occurred. In its motion for
review, JP contends that Mr. Mondragon' s claim should have been dismissed after it was shown that
the wheelbarrow handles could not have twisted his right knee as he described. However, the
Commission already considered and rejected this argument in remanding the matter to Judge Luke
for clarification of the medical panel's report.
The Appeals Board agrees with the Commission and Judge Luke that there was sufficient
evidence of a work injury and conflicting opinions with regard to its medical cause to refer the issue
to a medical panel. The evidence in the record supports Mr. Mondragon's claim that he sustained a
right-knee injury during the work accident even if it did not happen exactly as he described it to have
occurred. Indeed, the medical panel explained that individuals who suffer meniscal injuries often
feel they were hit in the knee as Mr. Mondragon did. The Appeals Board finds that it would be
unreasonable to foreclo.se Mr. Mondragon's claim under these circumstances.
JP's second argument is that it was prejudiced when Judge Luke impennissibly raised a
theory of the accident that Mr. Mondragon did not allege. Again, this ~rgument was previously
considered and rejected by the Commission. While the exact mechanism of injury is somewhat
uncertain in this case, such uncertainty is not fatal to Mr. Mondragon's claim. As both Judge Luke
and the Commission recognized, it is not uncommon for an injured worker to be unclear about a
specific exertion that leads to an internal injury. Mr. Mondragon was incorrect regarding how his
right knee became injured, but the record does show that his right knee was subject to significant
stress while carrying a fully loaded wheelbarrow that tipped over.
The Appeals Board does not agree with JP that Judge Luke advocated on behalf of Mr.
Mondragon by advancing an alternate theory of the accident because the significant stress on his
right knee was well-established in the record. JP had notice of the circumstances of the accident as
they were outlined by Dr. Britt at WorkMed almost immediately after the accident. Dr. Britt
recounted that Mr. Mondragon slipped when a full wheelbarrow tilted and caused him to feel a
sudden '~pop" and pain in his light knee. These are the circumstances that were the basis for the prior
decisions from Judge Luke and the Commission. The Appeals Board does not agree with JP that
either Judge Luke or the Commission impermissibly raised an alternate theory of the accident
because the underlying circumstances of the accident were contained in the record.
JP's last argument in its motion for review is that the matter should be remanded for
consideration of its legal-causation defense. JP submits that the more stringent standard of legal
causation outlined in Allen v. Industrial Comm 'n applies to Mr. Mondragon's claim because he had a
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pre-existing right-knee condition that contributed to his injury. JP refers to Dr. Fotheringham's
opinion that the work accident may have aggravated an underlying condition in Mr. Mondragon's
right knee as support for its position that the more stringent standard oflegal causation should apply
to the claim. The Appeals Board is not persuaded by this argument, however, because the medical
panel's report shows that Mr. Mondragon' s prior right-knee problems did not involve the joint. The
panel also explained that Mr. Mondragon's prior right-knee problems did not involve the same type
of symptoms he has with his current right-knee injury. The Appeals Board finds the medical panel's
clarified report to be well-reasoned and persuasive in light of the panel's impartial and collegial
review of the relevant medical evidence.
Even if the Appeals Board were to accept that the more stringent standard oflegal causation
applied to Mr. Mondragon's claim, the work activity of carrying a wheelbarrow full oflandscaping
material at a rapid pace over uneven ground as the wheelbarrow tips over likely constitutes an
unusual or extraordinary exertion when compared to those of modem non-employment life. The
Appeals Board does not agree with JP's contention that the totality of Mr. Mondragon's work
activity represents a normal or ordinary exertion just because it is relatively common for a
wheelbarrow to tip over.
Although Mr. Mondragon's mistaken description of exactly how his work injury occurred
presented a challenge in adjudicating his claim, his mistake was not fatal to his claim because the
underlying and dispositive circumstances of the accident were established in the record even though
the precise mechanism of injury was not. The Appeals Board agrees with Judge Luke and the
Commission that an injured worker, especially one who is unrepresented like Mr. Mondragon, may
make a mistake regarding an aspect of his or her claim and that the underlying evidence may be
considered and addressed by the factfinder without crossing into advocacy or infringing on the due
process rights of the employer or insurance carrier. That is essentially what took place in this case.
Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Board concurs with Judge Luke's decision awarding benefits to
Mr. Mondragon.

[ THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]
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ORDER

The Appeals Board affirms Judge Luke's decision dated April 29, 2015. It is so ordered.
Dated this JS-ri:-day of August, 2015.

~ ✓47~
Colleen S. Colton, Chair

~v,,sxf~
Patricia S. Drawe

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS

Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the
court within 30 days of the date of this order.

·)
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Affirming ALJ's Decision in the ~tterof Alberto
Mondragon, case number 12-0664, was mailed first class postage prepaid this dlff!_-day of August,
2015, to the following:
Alberto Mondragon
465 S lOOE
Ivins UT 84738
JP's Landscaping
2775 E Washington Dam Rd
Washington UT 84780
Owners Insurance Co.
Jake Olson Designated Agent
Box 690
Riverton UT 84065
Mark R. Sumsion, Esq.
Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson
Box 2465
Salt Lake City UT 8411 0

kYLL
Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission

\

I@

I
I

I

00206

@

AddendumD

APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ALBERTO MONDRAGON,
Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER DENYING REQUEST
FOR RECONSJDERA TION

JP 1 S LANDSCAPING and o·WNERS
INSURANCE CO,

Case No. 12-0664

Respondents.

JP's Landscaping and its insurance carrier, Owners Insurance Co/collectively referred to as
"JP") ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its prior decision to affinn
Judge Luke's award of benefits to Alberto Mondragon under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act,
Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated.
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to §63 G-4-302 of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED

Mr. Mondragon claims workers' compensation benefits for a right-knee injury he attribute·s to
an accident on May 22, 2012, while he was working for JP. In his application for hearing, Mr.
Mondragon asserts that he was pushing a full wheelbarrow when it tipped over and "caught" his right
knee. He later described that his right knee was caught and twisted between the handles of the
wheelbarrow as it tipped over.
Judge Luke held an evidentiary hearing, during which Mr. Mondragon was asked to
demonstrate how the injury occurred with a wheelbarrow similar to the one he was using at the time
of the accident. The demonstration showed that the wheelbarrow handles could not have caught and
twisted Mr. Mondragon's right knee as he alleged because they were too far apart. Judge Luke
nevertheless concluded it was "clear Mr. Mondragon felt a pop" in his right knee while working for
JP. Judge Luke referred the medical aspects of the claim to an impartial medical panel, which
described Mr. Mondragon's injury as a twisting injury. The panel concluded that Mr. Mond_ragon's
right-knee problems were medically caused by the work accident and recommended arthroscopic
evaluation. Judge Luke relied on the medical panel's opinion over JP's objection and awarded Mr.
Mondragon the cost of medical treatment and future medical care outlined by the panel.
JP requested review of Judge Luke's decision by arguing that the award of benefits was en-or
because the work accident could not have occurred as described by Mr. Mondragon. The
Commission determined that although Mr. Mondragon was probably mistaken about the exact
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mechanism of injury, there was sufficient evidence to show that he sustained a right-knee injury
while working for JP. The Commission remanded the matter to Judge Luke for clarification of the
medical panel's findings in light of the fact that the mechanism ofinjury was uncertain. On remand,
the medical panel clarified its reasoning and ultimately reiterated its opinion that Mr. Mondragon's
right-knee injury was medically caused by his employment with JP. Judge Luke relied on the
medical panel's clarified report and awarded Mr. Mondragon benefits, including the treatment
recommended by the medical panel.
JP sought review of Judge Luke's latest award from the Appeals Board, which rejected JP's
arguments and affirmed Judge Luke's award based on the medical evidence provided. JP now seeks
reconsideration of the Appeals Board's decision by arguing that Judge Luke and the Appeals Board
have impennissibly advocated for Mr. Mondragon while he has failed to respond to JP's various
motions. JP also submits that the award of benefits should be set aside so it can investigate potential
fraud as a defense against Mr. Mondragon's claim.
DISCUSSION
JP's contention that Judge Luke, the Commission, or the Appeals Board has engaged in
advocating for Mr. Mondragon has already been considered and rejected. Although Mr. Mondragon,
as an unrepresented party, has not submitted responses to all of JP's various motions in this matter,
the Appeals Board does not agree that the Commission has advocated on Mr. Mondragon's behalf.
Judge Luke, the Commission, and the Appeals Board each reviewed the evidence in the record,
including the medical evidence of Mr. Mondragon's work injury, and concluded that the evidence
was sufficient to show that the injury was compensable. Such conclusions were reached after
considering the arguments raised by JP and how they pertained to the evidence in the record. By not
responding to each motion, Mr. Mondragon risked the possibility that the Appeals Board might have
been persuaded more by JP's arguments than by Mr. Mondragon's position; however, the arguments
raised by JP in its motion for review were not persuasive in light of the evidence in the record.
JP also submits that Judge Luke's award of benefits should be set aside so that JP can
investigate whether Mr. Mondragon's claim is fraudulent. In its prior motion for review, JP
submitted records ofMr. Mondragon's past claims for workers' compensation benefits in an attempt
to impeach his credibility with regard to the present claim. The Appeals Board reviewed such
materials and found there to be no actual evidence of fraud on Mr. Mondragon's part. The
circumstances of the work accident, which occurred without witness and on the first day on the job,
were considered by the Appeals Board when it reviewed the evidence in the record. Ultimately, the
medical evidence that Mr. Mondragon sustained a twisting-type injury to his right knee consistent
with the strain of carrying a wheelbarrow on the date in question convinced the Appeals Board that
he had suffered a work-related injury and was entitled to the cost of treatment for such injury as
outlined by the medical panel. JP's assertion that Mr. Mondragon is not credible and may be
committing fraud is no more than speculation without evidence of actual fraud. Based on the
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foregoing, the Appeals Board denies JP's request for reconsideration and leaves the Appeals Board's
prior decision in effect.

ORDER
The Appeals Board denies the request for reconsideration filed by JP's Landscaping and
Owners' Insurance Company and reaffirms its prior decision of August 25, 2015. It is so ordered.
Dated this ~ a y of September, 2015.

~~~&z.
Colleen Colton, C6air

I.ii)·

~o-sd~~

Patricia S. Drawe

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Review
with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Request for Reconsideration in the
matt~ of Alberto Mondragon, case number 12-0664, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid this
~day of September, 2015, to the following:
A]berto Mondragon
465 S 100 E
Ivins UT 84738
JP's Landscaping
2775 E Washington Dam Rd
Washington UT 84780
Owners Insurance Co.
Jake Olson Designated Agent
Box 690
Riverton UT 84065
Mark R. Sumsion
Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson
Box 2465
Salt Lake City UT 84110

-~ILL2
Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission

